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“The History Question in Sino-Japanese Relations” 
Abstract:  
 Symbolized by the Rape of Nanking or the Nanjing Massacre, the history question or 
Japanese wartime atrocities and Japan’s continued failure at apology continues to impact Sino-
Japanese relations.  Applying feminist theory concepts to examine the formation of nationalism 
in China and Japan from the early modern period on and of the contemporary power dynamics 
underlying the interstate relations among China, Japan, and the United States can help to explain 
why the history question remains relevant in Sino-Japanese relations.  Modern nationalism in 
both China and Japan were founded upon Western incursion and a resulting loss of masculinity 
of the states as the governments proved incapable at safeguarding the national polities from 
Western forces.  The feminist notion of all politics being personal and of the importance of 
various interpenetrating levels of influence can help to elucidate the impact of contemporary 
civil society efforts such as civil lawsuits against Japan and Joint Textbook Writing efforts 
among China, Japan, and South Korea on Sino-Japanese reconciliation and the future of Sino-
Japanese relations.  
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 “The past comes to life by the way in which it relates to the present and to plans for the future.” 
          --Daqing Yang1  
Introduction: 
 Incomplete reconciliation continues to plague Sino-Japanese relations.  Sino-Japanese 
relations is not only important for the Asia-Pacific region, but has important implications for the 
global system.  With a population of about 1.3 billion, China surpassed Japan to become the 
second largest economy in the world in 2010.2  Moreover, a report by the Paris-based 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecasts that China will 
overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy in four years.3  China’s rapid 
growth paired with its opaque foreign policy decision-making process makes for a level of 
unease associated with its rise as a global power.  In addition, Sino-Japanese relations invariably 
ties in the United States as Japan is under the U.S. security umbrella and holds no regular 
military of its own due to World War II legacy.  Furthermore, in recent years China is seen to be 
increasingly assertive over issues of dispute. Sino-Japanese flare-ups over issues such as the 
enduring territorial disputes can potentially escalate to major instability in the region with global 
ramifications.   
 Many enduring issues between China and Japan can be attributed to incomplete 
reconciliation from World War II, when Japan invaded China from 1937 to 1945.4  Issues such 
as the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute cannot be understood without understanding the history 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Daqing Yang, “The Challenges of the Nanjing Masscre,” in The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, 
ed. Joshua Fogel,  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 153. 
2David Barboza, “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy,” New York Times, August 15, 2010. 
3Josephine Moulds, “China’s economy to overtake US in next four years, says OECD,” The Guardian, November 9, 
2012. 
4Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China Since 1989:From Balancing to Bandwagoning? (New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003),15. 
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behind issue and how each country chose to construct its national identity in the modern and 
contemporary era.  The islands have been in dispute among China, Japan, and the Republic of 
China in Taiwan for almost four decades: an unresolved legacy from an era of Japanese imperial 
expansion and U.S. ambiguity over its China policy under Cold War considerations.5  In the 
official sense, war reconciliation was achieved through efforts including the International 
Military Tribunal in the Far East in 1948, the Joint Statement of 1972, and the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship in 1978; in 1972 the Chinese state officially waived its claims to war reparations.6  
However, most Chinese today view the reconciliation as incomplete, Japan’s apology as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5“For almost four decades, China and Taiwan have disputed Japan’s sovereignty over several small rocky islands in 
the East China Sea, called Senkaku in Japanese, Diaoyu (or Diaoyutai in Taiwan) in Chinese.  More recently, Tokyo 
issued a white paper about China’s ‘more provocative and overconfident’ efforts to secure ownership of the islands 
based on the sightings in March and April of 2010 of sixteen Chinese military vessels, including a destroyer and 
submarine, passing near [the disputed islands].  In September 2010, the two states clashed over the Japanese arrest 
of a Chinese fisherman found in waters near the islands.  China’s main concern diplomatically was that allowing a 
Chinese to be tried in Japan would tacitly signal Chinese acceptance that the disputed islands are, in fact, Japanese.” 
Krista E. Wiegan, Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement 
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2011), 95.  
Again, the islands dispute is demonstrative of the United States’ intricate ties to Sino-Japanese relations.  In 
response to U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s warning against Chinese “unilateral action in the East China 
Sea over [the] disputed Senkaku island chain” in early 2013, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, 
criticized Clinton’s comments as “ignorant of facts and indiscriminate of rights and wrongs…He said that the United 
States—which controlled the islands from 1945 to 1972 before returning them to Japan—had ‘undeniable historical 
responsibility’ in the dispute.” 
Tania Branigan and Justin McCurry, “China rebukes US over ‘ignorant’ comments on island dispute with Japan,” 
The Guardian, January 21, 2013, < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/21/china-japan-senkaku-islands-
hillary-clinton>.  
China and Taiwan claim the island by asserting that it the islands were documented on Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) 
maps and part of Ming coastal defenses.  In addition, the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) placed the islands under 
Taiwanese jurisdiction, which was part of the Qing domain.  China and Taiwan argue that Japan gained claim over 
the islands as a part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which China considers to be one of the “unequal treaties” forced 
upon China during the period of foreign incursion.  Under the Treaty, China ceded Taiwan (Formosa) to Japan 
“together with all the islets appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.”   Therefore, China and Taiwan 
argue the islands should have been returned to China as a part of the Allied declarations at Cairo and Potsdam post-
World War II, which included restoring territories to China taken from it by from Japanese military aggression.   
However, Japan claims that its jurisdiction over the disputed islands “was an act apart from the Sino-Japanese 
War…U.S. administration of the islets began in 1953 as a result of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan.”  In the U.S. 
definition of boundaries of its Civil Administration of the Ryukus, the Senkaku islands were included.  Moreover, 
though the United States maintains a neutral diplomatic position on the islands dispute, the islands are officially 
included in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, as a part of U.S. obligation to defend Japan.   
Mark E. Manyin, “Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations,” Congressional Research 
Service, January 22, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf>. 
6In 1951, the United States pressured Japan to sign a peace treaty with the Republic of China in Taiwan.  However, 
this treaty was abrogated by the Japanese government in 1972 when it followed U.S. policy shift to instead 
recognize the People’s Republic of China on Mainland China.  
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inadequate or insincere.  Rational choice international relations theories including realism and 
liberalism fail to comprehensively explain why history and memory continue to impact Sino-
Japanese relations so heavily.  For instance, with regards to the islands dispute, if it were merely 
over the claim to potential energy resources, it would be more reasonable for the two parties to 
have negotiations over joint energy exploration; there lacks a willingness to negotiate over the 
issue because it is arguably merely symptomatic of the underlying issue of incomplete 
reconciliation.7 
 Symbolized by the Rape of Nanking or the Nanjing Massacre, the history question or 
Japanese wartime atrocities and Japan’s continued failure at apology continues to impact Sino-
Japanese relations.  Applying feminist theory concepts to examine the formation of nationalism 
in China and Japan from the early modern period on and of the contemporary power dynamics 
underlying the interstate relations among China, Japan, and the United States can help to explain 
why the history question remains relevant in Sino-Japanese relations.  Modern nationalism in 
both China and Japan were founded upon Western incursion and a resulting loss of masculinity 
of the states as the governments proved incapable at safeguarding the national polities from 
Western forces.  Today’s Chinese government utilizes this history of Chinese subjugation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7“The land features in question are eight in number, sometimes described as five islets and three rocks, and are 
uninhabited.  The largest is about two miles in length and less than one mile in width.  However, geologists believe 
that the waters surrounding them may be rich in oil and natural gas deposits.” 
Manyin.  
Wiegan, 97.  
Krista Wiegan argues that “domestic mobilization and accountability play some role in influencing Chinese dispute 
strategies.”  
Wiegand, 97. 
In addition, Krista Wiegand argues that in general, enduring territorial disputes exist because “challenger states in 
particular can actually benefit from the endurance of disputes when other salient disputed issues exist.  Such 
conditions provide an opportunity for states to pursue a strategy of issue linkage and coercive diplomacy.  The 
implication is that though territorial disputes are an underlying cause of tensions between states, it may not 
necessarily be the disputed territory that is driving the dispute, but instead other salient disputed issues linked to the 
territorial disputes.” 
Wiegand, 5. 
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order to narrate the significance of the Chinese Communist Party to safeguarding the Chinese 
national polity against foreign threats (in addition, Japan has come to embody the notion of 
foreign threats).  Memory of Japanese wartime atrocities has been reminded of and refocused to 
generate a newfound perception of threat of Japanese remilitarization because of the general 
Chinese understanding of Japan’s insufficient efforts at apology.8  Regionally, Japan’s power is 
hampered today by its neighbors’ memory of this modern history of aggression in Asia.  Both 
regionally and globally, its power is also increasingly checked by the rapid rise of China.  
China’s rise involves both increasing rivalry and unprecedented cooperation between China and 
the United States, building on another level of complicated insecurity for Japanese policymaking. 
Japan’s dependency on the United States for national defense subjugates its overall foreign 
policy to U.S. grand strategy and not only does Japan fear entrapment by U.S. policies that may 
seek to contain China, but it also harbors insecurity over unpredictable U.S. China policy shifts 
which undermines Japanese confidence in the U.S. security promise. Therefore, during this 
period as the Chinese government emphasizes the history question in Sino-Japanese relations 
(first as a means to regain domestic legitimacy, later perhaps to also artfully constrain Japan’s 
prospects for remilitarization and to generally undermine Japanese global and regional reputation 
based on historical transgressions and failure to apologize), the Japanese government will 
respond with rivaled assertiveness as its seeks to rebuild its own national pride and protective 
capacity.   
 Feminist theory can also shed light on why past reconciliation efforts are incomplete and 
how rising civil society in China and Japan will impact the future of reconciliation and Sino-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8With such an understanding of Japan as a country who has not properly repented for its past transgressions, signs of 
remilitarization become signals for a probable repeat of history.  Visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, which houses the spirits of Class A war criminals from the Second World War II, become confirmations of 
the Japanese threat to the Chinese.   
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Japanese relations.  Past reconciliation efforts were monopolized by the states and reflected a 
more realist posture of calculation of power politics.  For example, the Tokyo Trials were 
essentially orchestrated by the United States under Cold War considerations of growing U.S.-
Soviet rivalry.  Incomplete conciliation arguably demonstrates that a state-centric focus of 
reconciliation is not sufficient.  The feminist notion of politics being personal and of the 
importance of various interpenetrating levels of influence can help to elucidate the impact of 
civil society efforts such as civil lawsuits against Japan and Joint Textbook Writing efforts 
among China, Japan, and South Korea on Sino-Japanese reconciliation and the future of Sino-
Japanese relations.  
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Part 1: Failure of Mainstream IR Theory & A Feminist IR Theory Explanation 
 Before discussing the modern field of international relations theory, it is important to 
deconstruct the rational foundation of Western political philosophy, which forms the basis of 
today’s dominant international relations theories of realism and liberalism.  Foundational to 
rational thought on human nature and the formation of government is Thomas Hobbes’s 
articulation of the state of nature in the Leviathan.  To Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of 
war, whereby each individual pursues his/her own survival at any cost and life is “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short.”  This pursuit of survival or self-interest forms the basis of modern 
rational choice theories.  Moreover, Hobbes contends that people move into political society and 
government in order to live more peacefully because he argues that an endeavor for peace is a 
natural law formed from basic human reasoning.   
 While the notion that human nature is founded upon the strive for survival has become 
the basis of what is considered rational behavior, it does not fully capture fundamental human 
nature.  Hobbes does not clearly explicate how humans transition from a narrow pursuit of 
survival into forming political society.  In addition to survival, it is in human nature to seek 
belonging.  Humans are inherently social creatures and group formation is natural.  What is 
known as “nationalism” today is a concept that has evolved from early forms of group identity.  
When a group is formed, it is natural to form explicit and implicit criteria of what it means to be 
in the group.  In-group mentality is formed simultaneously with an idea of out-group 
characteristics to create group exclusivity that fosters each member’s feeling of belonging in 
his/her group.  While rational interests can have varied significance in group formation 
depending on the specific situational context, once a group is formed, some level of emotional 
bonding beyond rational calculations forms.  This bonding also builds upon the desire for 
	   10	  
belonging and merged with the understanding of the in-group criteria, forms the basis of what 
Benedict Anderson describes as an “imagined community,” which is elemental to nationalism.  
Even within a group that is small enough for each individual to have face-to-face interaction with 
one another, imagined commonalities further solidifies group identity beyond the individual 
bonds.  The fundamental desire for belonging forms the basis of the human emotive force.   
 The omission of the emotive force from rational choice theories is foundational to 
understanding the formation of our (heteronormative) society, which explicitly and implicitly 
privileges heterosexual male gender ideals.  Classical western philosophies largely assume 
rational behavior at its most basic level.  Reducing human nature to a singular pursuit of survival 
or self-interest does not accurately reflect human nature, but rather privileges rationality or 
human reason over emotions.  Moreover, rationality has come to be largely associated with the 
heterosexual male gender, while emotions are associated with the female gender (and “feminized 
males”).  In the process of becoming a political society, individuals form a contract and transfer 
to the government the role of safeguarding survival.  Thus, maintaining security is the basic 
function of a state.  By handing over security concerns to the state, people in a society are able to 
focus more on developing the “emotional” side of human nature, such as the development of 
culture, arts, and values, which merge and evolve to form the basis of what is referred to as 
national essence or national polity.  Thus, feminist study has been founded upon “[g]ender [as] 
an analytical tool” to examine how gender is used as an instrument for social distribution of costs 
and benefits, which underlie international politics and economics, “particularly with respect to 
inequality, insecurity, human rights, democracy, and social justice.”9   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9On a more social activist level, feminists also call to making “gender visible in order to move beyond its oppressive 
hierarchies.”  Arguably, feminist theories are inherently normative, seeking to achieve a more just world, as opposed 
to positivist theories such as realist and liberalism, which are more concerned with achieving system stability.   
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  The “classical tradition of international relations theory” include two main schools of 
thought: realism and liberalism.10  Over the years of development, various schools of realism and 
liberalism proliferated.  Since the 1980s, neorealism and neoliberalism tend to dominate the field 
of international relations theory.  Neorealism or structural realism was first described by Kenneth 
Waltz in 1979.  Waltz sought to make traditional realist theory more scientific by reformulating 
realism with “[t]he idea that international politics can be thought of as a system with precisely 
defined structure.”11  The structure is defined by anarchy, whereby states represent the ultimate 
units of sovereignty as states have the sole authority to maintain security.12  In an anarchic 
system, whereby there is no government above states, underlying each state’s concern is their 
relative power share.  Furthermore, each state follows a logic of self-help whereby their own 
national security interests and survival is of fundamental priority.   
 Neoliberalism developed largely in response to neorealism.  Though neoliberals agree 
with neorealists on the anarchic structure of the international system and on states being the 
central unit of analysis, neoliberals argue that cooperation is possible through building 
international institutions and that states are ultimately concerned with absolute rather than 
relative power.  As a leading neoliberal theorist, Joseph Nye argues that realist theory has always 
been weak in explaining, “[h]ow states define their interests, and how their interests change.”13  
Neoliberalism argues for the importance of institutions such as trade, which generate 
interdependence and cooperation in the long run, mitigating the potentially dangerous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
J. Ann Tickner Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 200), 134-135. 
10Joseph S. Nye, Jr., review of Neorealism and Its Critics, by Robert O. Keohane, and The Rise of the Trading State, 
by Richard Rosecrance, World Politics 40, no. 2 (1988): 238. 
11Kenneth Waltz, “Realist thought and neorealist theory,” in Critical Concepts in Political Science ed. Andrew 
Linklater (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1528. 
12Only states can maintain a standing military and other institutions of national security and defense.   
13Nye, 238.   
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consequences of self-help tendencies.  In addition, neoliberals argue that the neorealist concept 
of a state’s sole concern with relative gain points to a zero-sum world that is limited to military 
considerations, which is not reflective of the current world whereby economic activity 
predominates interstate relations.  In economics, such as in trade, the system is non-zero sum and 
actors seek absolute gains.14   
 However, neorealism and neoliberalism largely fail to explain why there exists continued 
emphasis on the “history” question in today’s Sino-Japanese relations.  A noted neorealist 
scholar, Stephen Walt, asserts that states balance against threat rather than power.  Walt argues 
that states use four main criteria to evaluate threat from another state: aggregate power (including 
population, economic and military capability), geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, 
and offensive intentions.15  Walt’s argument of perceived intentions is most problematic among 
his criteria as it is unclear how states develop their perception of another state’s intentions and 
how these perceptions change.16  With regards to China and Japan, neither balance of threat nor 
balance of power theory can explain why Beijing chose to revitalize the history problem in Sino-
Japanese relations in the late-1980s.  China began its opening and reform during the 1980s and 
sought to reintegrate with the global economy.  Moreover, after the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, 
Japan was one of the first developed countries that renewed normal relations with China.17  
Therefore, as a weak state seeking to grow, from a neorealist perspective it would be reasonable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14In rational trade theory, actors engage in activities of which they have a comparative advantage and then 
subsequently trade for the items that they lack comparative advantage, generating greater productivity overall in the 
system than before trade. 
15Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 22. 
16On a more general note, Walt’s emphasis on “intentions” over “power” is arguably in conflict with the overall 
neorealist notion that states in an anarchic system exhibit “self-help” logic because implicit in an anarchic 
international system is that intention cannot be deduced.  It detracts from the neorealist emphasis on structural 
determinants of state behavioral, which includes anarchy and relative distribution of power.   
17“Within little more than a year, Japan had renewed its loan agreements with China, and Japan’s foreign minister 
condemned Western efforts to isolate China.” 
Mark Eykholt, “Aggression, Victimization, and Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre,” in The Nanjing 
Massacre in History and Historiography, ed. Joshua Fogel,  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 43. 
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for China to build alliances.  In addition, a neorealist might expect the 1980s China to seek an 
alliance with Japan, an economic superpower and neighbor who did not harbor aggressive 
intentions.18  Yet, it was during this period that China initiated its Patriotic Education Campaign 
and capitalized on Japan’s failure to apologize.   
 Neoliberals would likely further argue that from an economic standpoint, the 1980s 
China should choose to cooperate more with Japan as the probable long-term gains from trade 
and Japanese investments are immense.  However, Beijing was able to engage economically with 
Japan while simultaneously launching criticism over Japanese revisionism.  Moreover, while 
neoliberals would assert that increased trade over time builds interdependence and thus 
cooperation, China appears to become only more assertive regarding historical disputes with 
Japan after the years of increased bilateral trade.19  In 2010, over a flare-up of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, China blocked the export of crucial rare earth minerals to 
Japan.20   
 In contrast to neorealism and neoliberalism, feminist international relations analysis takes 
a more sociological approach.  It looks at “individuals’ behavior as embedded within a network 
of structures that are socially constructed.”21  These networks of structures are often the main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18In terms of aggregate power, through the 1980s Japan had one of the largest economies of the world and 
maintained a modern military structure under U.S. tutelage.  Though Walt argues that greater geographic proximity 
generally entails greater threat, overall he seems to argue that perception of the other state’s intentions is most 
important in determining threat.  Japan and China are geographically very close, though they do not share a border.  
Technically, Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution prohibits Japan from harboring any offensive or belligerent capability.  
Its Self-Defense Forces are for defense only.  Moreover, there was no demonstration of aggressive intention by 
Japan in the 1980s. 
19“In 1993 Japan began a massive investment plan in China, part of a trend that saw trade volume between the two 
countries increase by at least 20 percent each year from 1991 to 1994.  By the end of 1994 this trade would top USD 
43 billion, as Japan was China’s primary trading partner and one-fifth of all China’s trade went to Japan.” 
Eykholt, 44. 
20Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Crucial Exports to Japan,” New York Times, September 23, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/global/24rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
21Tickner, 132. 
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unit of analysis, as opposed to states.  Moreover states are often analyzed for their underlying 
gender biases.  Feminist research tends to question rigid binary confines including 
“domestic/international, public/private, and state/society.”22  Therefore, topics such as security 
are analyzed in “multidimensional terms and interpenetrating levels, beginning with the security 
of individuals situated within broader social and global structures.”23  Feminism draws from 
many disciplines, including history, sociology, critical theories, and postmodernism.  Moreover, 
some characterize types of feminism based upon the subjects of focus, including International 
Political Economy (IPE) feminism and postcolonial feminism.24  Because there are various 
schools of feminism, this study draws on selected concepts for development and application. 
 In examining the formation of national identity, Prasenjit Duara describes the “nation [as] 
the guardian of an unchanging truth it believes to embody,” which Duara terms the “regime of 
authenticity.”25  The regime of authenticity is transmitted through a linear history of the modern 
nation-state and “invokes various representations of authoritative inviolability.”26  Importantly, 
Duara argues that in many societies, women tend to embody the regime of authenticity or the 
national essence.  In the development of nationhood, “[e]xplored, mapped, conquered, and raped, 
the female body and its metaphorical extension, the home, become symbols of honor, loyalty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22Tickner, 132. 
23Tickner, 132. 
24According to Tickner, IPE feminists seek to “uncover hidden power structures that reinforce unequal gender 
relations” by researching topics such as explaining “women’s disproportionate representation at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic scale in all societies.” 
Tickner, 79.  
“Post-colonial feminists point out that Third World women face multiple oppressions, based on racism and 
imperialism as well as the patriarchy that is characterized in Western feminist analyses.”  They capitalize on the 
importance of locally produced knowledge, “rather than relying on Western knowledge and with its false claims of 
universalism.”   
Tickner, 87. 
25Prasenjit Duara, “The Regime of Authenticity: Timelessness, Gender, and National History in Modern China,” in 
History and Theory 37, no. 3 (1998): 288. 
26Duara, 294. 
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and purity, to be guarded by men.”27  Thus, regimes can claim legitimacy by casting themselves 
as the guardians of the authenticity of the “body cultural.”28  Though regimes seek to monopolize 
the characterization of what constitutes the nation’s authenticity, Duara also notes the people’s 
role in co-constructing and sustaining the nation’s regime of authenticity.  Duara’s insights are 
in-line with that of other feminist scholars, which argue that the process of building national 
identity or nationalism is inherently gendered.29 
In addition to national essence, nationalism is also built from interactions with other 
states.   Cynthia Enloe’s concept of injured masculinity identity is applicable in understanding 
how foreign incursion and perceived humiliation impacted the formation of nationalism in China 
and Japan.  Enloe’s approach is founded upon imperial legacy, and thus the rise of nationalism 
arguably in response to invasion, occupation, and colonization.  Enloe makes the argument of 
injured masculinity-based nationalism largely through examining the ways that peoples of 
subjugated nations express nationalism.  For instance, she concluded that in India, “[a]sserting 
control over one’s body as a way of rejecting the alien forces of colonialism, secularism, and 
modernity has been an important component of men’s nationalism in India.”  An example is 
Mahatma Gandhi’s celibacy.  Another way that injured masculinity manifests itself is the level of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27Duara, 297. 
28Duara, 307. 
29Anne McClintock describes “time as a natural division of gender. Women are represented as the atavistic and 
authentic body of national tradition (inert, backward-looking, and natural), embodying nationalism’s conservative 
principle of continuity.  Men, by contrast, represent the progressive agent of national modernity (forward-thrusting, 
potent, historic), embodying nationalism’s progressive, or revolutionary, principle of discontinuity.   
Anne McClintock, “’No Longer in a Future Heaven’: Gender, Race, and Nationalism,” in Dangerous Liaisons: 
Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives, ed. Anne McClintock et. al.  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997): 92.  
I use the following definition of  nationalism, “the attitude that members of a nation have when they care about their 
national identity, and the actions that the members of nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-
determination.” 
Nenad Miscevic, "Nationalism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/nationalism/. 
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ideological weight attached to the attire and sexual purity of women in the community, by men.30  
Furthermore, Enloe asserts that nationalism is founded upon “masculinized memory, 
masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope.”31 
Adopting an injured masculinity identity powerfully galvanizes a people’s imagination 
and mobilizes and unites a people for the common mission of regaining masculinity.  The 
process of regaining masculinity often involves redefining or reemphasizing what is the nation’s 
national essence and then taking actions to preserve or safeguard the national essence.  Injured 
masculinity essentially involves an incursion upon a nation’s national essence, whether it 
involves invasion of territory or way of life, or both.  Because national essence is often embodied 
in the female gender, as described by Duara, the state or government which is typically regarded 
as the official protector of a nation’s essence experiences first, a loss of masculinity.  This loss of 
masculinity is also felt by the people who witness the subjugation of their government and either 
experience subjugation themselves and/or witness or recognize the subjugation of their fellow 
nationals.  Though national essence is often characterized as feminine and the concept of 
protecting the national essence is viewed as masculine, it does not mean that among the people, 
only males will experience a loss of masculinity from an event such as foreign subjugation.  Both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30Enloe further argues that such weight is attached to women because women are seen as “(1) the community of the 
nation’s most valuable possessions, (2) the principle vehicles for transmitting the whole nation’s values from one 
generation to the next, (3) bearers of the community’s future generation, (4) the members of the community most 
vulnerable to defilement and exploitation by oppressive alien rulers, and (5) most susceptible to assimilation and 
cooperation by insidious outsiders,”  
Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1989),54.   
31Enloe, 44. 
Similarly, in Worlding Women, Jan Jindy Pettman speaks of “[t]he young man [who] goes to war not so much to kill 
as to die, to forfeit his particular body for that of the larger body, the body politic, a body most often presented and 
represented as feminine: a mother country bound by citizens speaking the mother tongue.” 
Jin Jindy Pettman, Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996): 142. 
Ann Tickner describes how war is valorized “through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity [which] 
depends on a feminized, devalued notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic.” 
Tickner, 49. 
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male and female sexes can carry varying degrees and combinations of masculinity and 
femininity based on their roles in society and the situations that they are faced with.  For instance, 
today the emperor of Japan continues to embody Japan’s national essence as he has for millennia, 
but he also embodies Japan’s de-masculinization from its World War II legacy.  In the aftermath 
of the war, under U.S.-led Allied Occupation, the Constitution that was imposed upon Japan 
revoked its power to maintain a normal military force and removed all formal authority of the 
emperor, relegating him to a ceremonial figurehead.   
The perception of a loss of masculinity is amplified through the feedback loops among 
the interplay of the state’s understanding, the general public’s understanding, and the 
understanding of individuals who are acutely affected (such as survivors of rape).  After the loss 
of masculinity is recognized, the process of redefining or rediscovering the national essence can 
be a long one.  Moreover, a weakened government opens up opportunity for various contending 
groups to compete for rule, which often entails a competition of national narratives.  Thus after a 
group takes power and their national narrative becomes the widely accepted one, steps to 
actualize regaining masculinity can be carried out.  Therefore, there exists a tacit agreement 
between the new government and the people that the government will successfully follow 
through with strengthening the country and safeguarding the national essence that has been 
defined.  This process of regaining masculinity can also be long and arduous and marked with 
setbacks.  Over extended periods of time, national interests and narratives tend to change based 
upon various changing external and internal circumstances.  When a state feels a loss of domestic 
legitimacy for whatever reason, the state can choose to rekindle the narrative of injured 
masculinity to reignite popular nationalism and to refocus people’s attention on how the state is 
performing at regaining masculinity for the nation.   
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This dynamic process of formulating national narratives and postures in addition to the 
interplay of the evolution of relations between and among China, Japan, and the United States 
from the early modern times can be used to explain why the history question continues to impact 
Sino-Japanese relations today. As the ultimate patriarch in the triangular relationship today and 
with Japan under its security umbrella, the United States has played important roles in 
influencing the national narratives in China and Japan, especially since the end of the Second 
World War.  U.S. Occupation legacy significantly impacted post-Occupation politics and 
identity-seeking in Japan.  Thus, I argue that both rational calculations, culminating in a state’s 
concern for hard power and a national narrative that binds people together under a state are 
important for a state’s maintenance of power and legitimacy.  The following analysis accepts the 
centrality of states in our current international system as it has become entrenched in today’s 
understanding of global relations.   
What the following analysis hopes to elucidate is that while states are mostly inherently 
rational institutions that seek to maintain their own survival, interstate relations can exhibit 
“irrational” qualities (e.g. the history question in Sino-Japanese relations) because of intricacies 
involved in gaining and maintaining domestic legitimacy.  For a group to gain control and 
become the state and for a state to continue in existence, some form of domestic legitimacy has 
to be sustained.  A state that loses control over the military or cannot maintain a strong enough 
military and/or if the state cannot maintain a stable economy, the state tends to lose domestic 
legitimacy, as it has no capacity to confront foreign invasion and/or domestic unrest and power 
struggles.  However, possessing hard power capacity is necessary but not sufficient for domestic 
legitimacy.  As survival and the desire for belonging are both fundamental to human nature, 
states also need to sustain national narratives that inculcate nationalism and patriotism in their 
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citizenry to maintain domestic legitimacy; a degree of nationalistic education is foundational to 
most functioning countries today.   The intricate interplay among demonstrating hard power 
capabilities (most fundamentally, military, and then economic capacity for sustainability) and 
constructing effective national narratives, which often involve amplifying the national trauma 
and glory associated to particular historical events, involved in forming and sustaining domestic 
legitimacy impacts a state’s exterior postures with other states.  When such a narrative is build 
up to sustain a state’s legitimacy and tie a people together, the state will have to somehow 
demonstrate that they are carrying out what they narrate.32  Thus, states can be domestically 
pressured to make foreign policy choices that appear “irrational.”  
Furthermore, these postures are interpreted by other states based upon their understanding 
of the historical context, play into their national narratives, and become further complicated 
when such issues come to be used to leverage regional and international relations precisely 
because the historical context matters.  As China continues to emphasize the history in its 
bilateral relations with Japan, Japan further refocuses these postures to demonstrate to the 
Japanese populace how the Chinese government demonizes Japan to serve its own legitimacy.  
The posture feeds into Japan’s own recent patriotic education to inculcate national pride amid a 
time of uncertainty of Japanese nationality due to its faltering economy.  Moreover the posture is 
also effective in reminding other Asian states of the memory of Japanese aggression, thus 
creating regional pressure against Japanese remilitarization efforts.  In addition, calling Japan a 
continued transgressor can undermine its international reputation and affect U.S.-Japan relations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32In the case of North Korea, as regular citizens have essentially no access to information that is not censored and 
propagated by the state, the state can effectively make up a story of how they successfully confronted and defeated 
evil Western powers to continue to demonstrate to the populace the reality of the state of the world that the state has 
narrated from the beginning. 
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As a result, it is difficult for state-level reconciliation to occur in China and Japan today.  
The Chinese and Japanese states’ respective efforts to inculcate domestic confidence in their 
state’s masculinity feeds into a cycle in which each state’s assertiveness provokes a response that 
is rivaled in assertiveness.  Cynthia Enloe’s assertion that ‘all politics is personal’ describes the 
importance of individuals and broadly “non-traditional” actors in international relations.  The 
activities and cooperation of individuals and civil groups in China and Japan may prove to be 
important for long-term reconciliation.  These sub-state level interactions allow for a 
personalized exchange of ideas and values without high levels of political calculations.  
Moreover, the United States plays into this process through its active civility that is backed by 
U.S. soft power, which involves U.S. influence based upon the attractiveness of its values and 
institutions.  As a hegemon in the global system, the United States exerts influence over the 
international sociopolitical dialogue.   
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Part 2: Historical Basis: Early Modern to Cold War Era  
Early Modern to Modern Period: Founding of Early Chinese Nationalism: 
 In order to understand why Chinese nationalism today contains such a strong element of 
incomplete reconciliation and subsequently, a level of antagonistic feeling towards Japan, it is 
useful to go back in time to examine the course of development of nationalism in China.  Modern 
nationalism in China can be traced back to the self-strengthening movements in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which developed in response to western imperialism.  
What is still referred to as China’s “century of humiliation” dates from the First Opium War in 
1839.  The war launched the first in a series of losses for Qing China and subsequent unequal 
treaties, which forced Qing China to hand over treaty ports, grant rights of extraterritoriality, 
among other concessions.33  Following British lead, other Western powers including Russia, 
Germany, and France forced the Qing government to hand over concessions and each carved up 
their sphere of influence in China.   
 At this point, China’s national essence can be understood to be the idea of the 
fundamental superiority of the Chinese civilization, marked by superior culture and morality.  
Called the Middle Kingdom, China saw itself as encompassing the entire world, with its core 
civilization being at the center of the world.  Official tributary states represented the next level in 
the hierarchy of cultural sophistication.  States that China did not have diplomatic relations or 
much contact with represented the very outer rings of what might be considered civilization; 
essentially those states were considered too barbaric to even engage with China properly.  
Chinese ideas of civilization are largely based upon Confucianism, including strict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33Extraterritoriality rights allowed foreign residents in port cities to be tried by their own consular authorities rather 
than going through the Qing legal system. 
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understandings of hierarchical relations based upon the emperor as the supreme patriarch and 
with paternal hierarchy reproduced in each household with the father as the family patriarch.  As 
opposed to being held as entrenched subjugation of the weak, these unequal relations are upheld 
with moral ideals of how the stronger party will safeguard the best interests of the weaker party 
in exchange for complete submission by the weaker party, in order to maintain overall societal 
order and stability.  This moralistic hierarchical understanding also forms the basis of Sino-
centric international relations, with China, represented by the Chinese emperor, at the top.  
Western incursions and overwhelming Qing defeats represented not only invasions of Chinese 
territory but also challenged the capability of the paternal essence of Sino-centric civilization that 
had been developed over thousands of years.   
 The period of continued foreign incursion in late Qing China generated a grave concern 
for the demise of China as the supreme patriarch of the Sino-centric international system and 
shook up the foundations of China’s national essence.  One of the major problems of late Qing 
was that the government failed to recognize the changing power distributions in the world: the 
Chinese official, Lin Zexu’s letter to the British crown, which addressed Queen Victoria 
diminutively as a leader of a barbaric power in the outermost fringes of a Sino-centric 
civilization. Even after realizing continuous defeats, Qing leadership failed to carry out 
comprehensive reforms because among the ruling elite, there existed elements that concerned 
only of their personal power and those who were psychologically unwilling to accept China’s 
helplessness at the hands of people that they viewed as the most barbaric among the barbarians.  
These elements hampered reform efforts of the “self-strengthening movement.”  The self-
strengthening movement was led by scholars such as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei who 
proposed expanding democracy and adopting Western technology, especially for the military. 
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 A concern for the loss of protective capability or “masculinity” is embodied in the 
perception of China becoming the “sick man of Asia.”  The  phrase “sick man of Asia” or 东亚
病夫 originates from Liang Qichao’s translation of a British news article published in Shanghai 
in 1896.34  Though the original author may not have intended for such an evocative appeal, the 
phrase caught on in China, capturing the multifaceted weaknesses of late Qing and the 
humiliation from being labeled as such from people who the Chinese belittled as outside 
barbarians just about fifty years ago.  Moreover at the time, China would have just suffered 
defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).  Defeat at the hands of Japan, a non-Western 
and centuries-long semi-vassal state brought upon an unprecedented level of humiliation and 
alarm.  In addition, “[i]t has been argued that because China’s modernity has been largely a 
project of Chinese male intellectuals, delays in achieving modernization entailed a ‘besiegedness’ 
of Chinese masculinity.”35  
 As the demise of the Qing dynasty became increasingly evident towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, contenders for rule over China sought to redefine China’s national essence 
and how lost masculinity can be regained.  One of the main contenders was the Revolutionary 
Alliance or Tongmenghui led by Sun Yat-sen.  “Sun’s political philosophy was the ‘three 
principles of the people.’”36  Sun represented the generation of Chinese revolutionary 
intellectuals who received thorough Western education and sought to replace the dynastic system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34“东亚病夫,” Baidu 百科, accessed on April 2, 2013, http://baike.baidu.com/view/582724.htm. 
35Yiyan Wang, “Mr. Butterfly in Defunct Capital: ‘Soft Masculinity and (mis)engendering China,” in Asian 
Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of Manhood in China and Japan, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 54.   
36The Three Principles are nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood.  By nationalism, Sun refers to the need 
for Chinese to unite and foster a multiethnic Chinese nationalism in order to regain the full sovereignty of the 
Chinese state.  Democracy meant a Western-style constitutional government that represents people’s interests and is 
held accountable to the people.  People’s livelihood is a nebulous concept that refers broadly to social welfare.   
Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2004), 28. 
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with a republican nation-state (as opposed to attempting to reform late Qing, as represented by 
the older generation of ‘self-strengtheners’).37   The other main contender was Yuan Shikai, who 
consolidated Qing military power under his authority.  Yuan’s contention represents more of a 
continuity of the pattern of rise and demise of dynastic cycles throughout the history of pre-
modern China.  Sun’s revolutionary group was in no position to directly confront Yuan’s forces 
and was thus forced to negotiate with Yuan, allowing Yuan to become the second president of 
the Republic of China.  Bowing down to Japanese demands such as the extension of 
extraterritoriality and declaring himself emperor of China made Yuan’s republic no different 
than late Qing. 38     
 Sun Yat-sen’s failure to delivery a true republican revolution demonstrated the 
significance of military power.  The subsequent rise of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) reflected maturation of Sun’s revolutionary idealism and further efforts 
at redefining China’s national essence.  The KMT evolved from Sun’s former Revolutionary 
Alliance.  It continued to carry on the Three Principles of People while adding military 
leadership, as represented by its new leader, Chiang Kai-shek, who was the Commander of the 
KMT’s Whampoa Military Academy before succeeding Sun.   Officially established in 1921, the 
CCP initially aligned its efforts with the KMT.  The early CCP represented an effort to join the 
international Marxist revolution and duplicate the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.  
Despite initial cooperation, by 1927 Chiang began to view the CCP as a mounting threat to his 
authority and launched a series of extermination campaigns against the CCP.  During this period 
when the CCP faced near extermination, it broke away from Comintern guidance and found new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Sun received his early education in Hawaii and then studied in British Hong Kong.   Moreover, Sun converted to 
Christianity and received revolutionary influences while exiled in Japan and Europe.   
38 If fully accepted, the notorious Twenty-one demands would have relegated China to a semicolony.   
Liberthal, 29.   
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leadership under Mao Zedong who called for a rural, peasant-based revolution.  Chiang 
considered the CCP, to be a “a ‘disease of the heart,’ which he said, must be cured before other, 
more superficial challenges to the body politic (in this case, he was referring to the Japanese).”  
Under Chiang Kai-shek’s military leadership, the KMT had consolidated power from regional 
warlords and nearly eradicated the CCP by 1934.  Japan’s invasion in 1937 interrupted the civil 
war in China and gave the CCP time to recuperate while the KMT was forced to confront the 
Imperial Japanese Army.    
Early Modern to Modern Period: Founding of Early to Wartime Japanese Nationalism: 
  Early Japanese nationalism also formed in response to foreign incursion during the age of 
Western imperialism.  Tokugawa Japan witnessed the “internal unrest and foreign incursions that 
wracked contemporary China” and experienced a taste of western imperialism with the arrival of 
U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry and his crew in 1853.  Perry’s aggressive diplomacy led to the 
Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854, which included a most-favored nation clause and provided an 
opening to allow for further contact and trade with Japan.  Perry’s squadron, including the so-
called “Black Ships” conveyed to Japan the West’s power by virtue of its technological prowess 
(in particular, military technology).39  This subjugation and demonstration of the weakness of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate lead to the resolve in the following Meiji period to modernize and 
strengthen Japan.  Moreover, in addition to physically strengthen Japan, early nationalist scholars 
such as Aizawa Seishisai “called for a revival of ancient Japanese myths which postulated that 
all Japanese people were descendants of the same divine ancestress, the Sun Goddess 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39“The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed 
April 4, 2013, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/OpeningtoJapan. 
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Amaterasu.”40  In contrast to the trajectory in late Qing, Japanese progressives sought 
modernization through restoring power under the emperor and adding modernized state 
institutions.     
 The process of experiencing foreign incursion to recognizing the loss of masculinity to 
redefining the national essence and actualizing a plan for restoring state masculinity occurred 
much faster in Japan, allowing Japan to become an imperialist power by the early twentieth 
century.  The Meiji Restoration in 1868 occurred only little over a decade after the Treaty of 
Kanagawa.  In contrast to the various dynasties throughout Chinese history ruled by various 
family lines, the Japanese imperial line is viewed as one continuous line from the beginning of 
civilization.  Imperial rule is interrupted by periods of de facto shogun rule, which is akin to a 
military dictatorship.  Shoguns or Seii-taishogun (“Barbarian Subduing Generalisso”) gained 
power during periods of heightened threat of external invasion though consolidating military 
authority and demonstrating their capability at safeguarding the empire.  Therefore, 
overthrowing the Tokugawa Shogunate and restoring power to the emperor as the Tokugawa 
government proved unable to stand up to the United States was a very legitimate rhetoric for the 
progressives; this rhetoric is captured in the popular political slogan during the period, Sonno joi 
(“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians”).  The Meiji Constitution created a constitutional 
monarchy with the emperor as the head of state; the Constitution was presented in 1899 as a gift 
from the emperor to the people.41  The Meiji period is characterized by the pursuit of fukoku 
kyohei (“enrich the country, strengthen the military”).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40Erica Benner, “Japanese National Doctrines in International Perspective,” in Nationalisms in Japan, ed. Naoko 
Shimazu, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21. 
41The Meiji Constitution began with these words: ‘The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line 
of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.’” 
Linda K. Menton, ed. The Rise of Modern Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 67. 
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 To regain loss masculinity, Meiji Japan sought to demonstrate itself as a modern imperial 
state.  In the words of Ito Hirobumi, a Meiji statesman, “The aim of our country has been from 
the very beginning, to attain among the nations of the world the status of a civilized nation and to 
become a member of the comity of European and American nations which occupy the position of 
civilized countries.”42  As a part of its modernization efforts, Japan adopted the Prussian public 
health system to establish standards for the health and physique of the Japanese.  “The 
quantification and classification of the population’s physical condition was considered one of the 
most important tasks in establishing a modern nation whose main characteristics were declared 
to be a prosperous economy and a potent military.”43  Meiji state efforts to rally nationalism were 
augmented by popular media, which often linked economic success to reproductive capabilities 
and military prowess to sexual potency.  It appeared that Japan put into action what, according to 
Eric Benner, the liberal nationalist scholar Fukuzawa Yukichi had expressed as “[w]ar [being] an 
honorable and necessary means of ‘extending the rights of independent governments’ according 
to the Western norms that Japan had now to embrace.”44 
 However, even after demonstrating its newfound capability or masculinity through 
winning the First Sino-Japanese War (1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and annexing 
Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1910), Japan perceived that it continued to be treated as a second-rate 
power among Western states.  Declaring war on Germany and joining the Allied side of World 
War I in 1914, Japan expected to gain recognition as an equal power.  Nonetheless, Japan 
experienced humiliation of its masculinity at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) when the fate of 
the Shandong peninsula in China was debated.  “Both the Japanese elite and intellectuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42Benner, 28. 
43Sabine Fruhstuck, Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2003), 21. 
44Benner, 32. 
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believed that that former German interests on the Shandong Peninsula should be transferred to 
Japan without question.  Meanwhile, the Chinese started to demand the restoration of various 
rights they had lost to the powers since the mid-nineteenth century” and the United States 
expressed support for China.45  This next level of injured masculinity faced from the West led to 
the next period of unprecedented Japanese imperial aspirations, which involved a break with the 
West.  “[T]he Japanese intellectuals saw that the [West’s] standards themselves could shift, and 
would probably keep shifting, thus making it almost impossible for second- and third-ranking 
nations (including Japan) to meet them.  Japan would never be able to cast off its badge of 
inferiority.”46   
 The proclamation of the Co-Prosperity Sphere led to Japan’s most aggressive period of 
empire-building including the invasion of China (1937-1945) and demonstrated Japan’s effort to 
prove its masculinity by claiming superiority and leadership over Asia.  In 1931, Japan began its 
invasion of Manchuria with the Mukden Incident and subsequently withdrew from the League of 
Nations after other members of the League challenged Japan’s aggression in China.47  Soon, that 
led to Japan’s proclamation of creating “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in the 
name of ending Western imperialism in Asia, fostering a pan-Asian bond.48  As an island with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45Harumi Goto-Shibata, “Internationalism and nationalism: Anti-Western sentiments in Japanese foreign policy 
debates, 1918-22,” in Nationalisms in Japan, ed. Naoko Shimazu (New York: Routledge, 2006), 72. 
46Goto-Shibata, 77. 
47“The Mukden Incident of 1931 and the Stimson Doctrine,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 
accessed April 6, 2013, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/Mukden_incident. 
48In general, pan-Asian writings in Japan referred to the following commonalities when proclaiming an ‘Asian 
identity’: the cultural unity of the peoples and nations of East Asia, based upon the common use of Chinese 
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legacy of the Sinocentric order, representing a traditional framework for interstate relations in East Asia, but also 
close economic relations; the feeling of a ‘common’ destiny (unmei kyodatai) in the struggle of Asia or colored 
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Sven Saaler, “Pan-Asianism Asianism in modern Japanese history: overcoming the nation, creating a region, forging 
an empire,” in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. J. Victor 
Koschmann et al. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 10. 
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limited natural resources, Japan sought to build a self-sufficient empire whereby it would no 
longer require approval from the West.  
 As Japan moved towards more assertive empire building in the 1930s, “early Showa 
ideologues as well as marketing professionals aligned (female) reproductivity and (male) sexual 
energy with practices of invasion, aggression, and war.”49  “By December 1937, cartoons and 
other authorized mass media had immersed the ordinary public in narratives intended to mobilize 
the war effort and to legitimize Japan’s aggression in China.  Accounts of the Battle of Nanjing 
were no exception.”50  Wartime reporting in Japan rallied around pride in the Imperial Army in 
bringing rightful justice to China.  Justification of any atrocities involved attributing blame to 
Chiang Kai-shek and his “anti-Japanese” movement; “[w]artime narratives emphasized the idea 
that the state owns its citizens and that public well-being depended on the state and its leaders.” 
The justification can be understood as, since Chiang Kai-shek and his government had failed to 
demonstrate capable leadership in safeguarding the interests of the Chinese body politic, Japan 
will step in and take over the role in becoming the (male) protector of the (female) Chinese 
nation.51    
Post-WWII/Cold War Era: China Under Mao: 
 In the post-war era, under Chairman Mao Zedong, China’s national identity came to be 
built around national strength through the charisma of Mao.  “As leading communist officials 
have subsequently commented, ‘[w]e felt Mao could see farther than we could see and could 
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49Fruhstuck, 168. 
50Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “Rape of Nanking,” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 15. 
51“By the 1930s Japanese school textbooks taught students to believe in Japan’s superior position in Asia, to view 
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Eykholt, 17. 
	   30	  
understand more than we could understand.  Therefore, when we did not understand Mao, we 
assumed that he was right and we were wrong.”52  Mao sought to legitimize his rule by 
showcasing the accomplishments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and how they were 
responsible for saving China at the hands of the Japanese, while portraying KMT’s failure at 
safeguarding Chinese sovereignty.53  However, because the CCP’s military arm, the PLA, did 
not actually engage in much combat with the Japanese army, the study of and investigations into 
the war were largely limited to the party line.  The Rape of Nanking, among other defeats on the 
Chinese side was largely ignored in official Communist Chinese history and writing, which was 
the only authority on history.54  Mao sought to establish inward legitimacy by portraying how the 
CCP and PLA had successfully saved China from imperialist aggression and therefore 
communism or Maoism is the rightful path for China’s revival and for China to regain its 
manhood among the nations of the world.   
 One of the ways that Mao tried to demonstrate communist China’s newfound strength 
was through the ambitious involvement with the Korean War or known in China as “the War to 
Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.”55  Under the Cold War context, Communist China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52“Mao had brought the party from a devastation of the failure of the Ruijin in 1934 to nationwide victory in 1949.  
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leading CCP officials.” 
Lieberthal, 54-55. 
53They also wanted to erase any history including the involvement of the Kuomintang, which actually fought most 
of the battles against the Japanese.  
54Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2005), 39. 
“[H]istorians at Nanjing University had gathered a great amount of data, including photographs, new statistics, and 
interviews with survivors, and in 1962 they collected it into an eight-chapter manuscript.  This manuscript has since 
served as a basis for further work on the Massacre, even though it was hostage to the political ideology…The 
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Eykholt, 25.   
55“The Korean War of 1950-1953 is a major benchmark in the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China 
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naturally sided with the U.S.S.R. and the United States became the archetype of aggressor and 
enemy.  In the 1950s, the PRC government used the Nanjing Massacre as political tool directed 
against the United States, portraying the “American humanitarians as being as evil as, if not 
more than, invading Japanese troops.”56  U.S. retreat in the Korean War gave Mao tremendous 
boost in domestic popularity and Chinese national pride, as this “marked the first time in more 
than a century that Chinese troops faced those of the Western countries and did not suffer a 
humiliating defeat.”57   
 Mao’s death in 1976 opened the door to a more sober criticism of the failure of the CCP’s 
socioeconomic policies and to a search for a more practical roadmap for reviving China.  Mao’s 
concern for maintaining his own power and position led to his implementation of repeated purges 
of “capitalistic elements” and of renewed revolutions, which led to millions of deaths, economic 
and technological backwardness, social instability, and no space for honest appraisal.  However, 
because he had been catapulted to an almost god-like figure, his presence was equivalent to the 
Party’s legitimacy and he could not be faulted.  Therefore, his death provided an opportunity for 
people to criticize the Party’s failure (which is not a direct criticism of Mao) to help China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Allen Suess Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1960), vii. 
56According to a journal article published in March 1951 in Beijing, “an American devil deceived Chinese women 
and gathered them in one place so that Japanese soldiers could kidnap young and beautiful Chinese girls in order to 
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Yoshida, 68-69.   
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actualize its (masculine) capacity through measures such as economic prosperity.  China’s next 
Communist leader, Deng Xiaoping, began a project of “reform and opening up” in 1978.58   
Post WWII/Cold War Era: Japan Under Allied Occupation and Occupation Legacy: 
“like a boy of twelve”        --General Douglas MacArthur59 
  In the immediate aftermath of Japan’s surrender, Japanese people and U.S. 
Occupation jointly fostered Japan’s embrace of victimhood, which resulted in a feminization of 
the Japanese state.   Instead of remembering itself also as an aggressor during the war, the chosen 
memory was Japan as victim.  “August 6, the day the United States dropped the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima became a national day to commemorate the death and destruction of that incident as 
well as the war in general.”60  First, a narrative was built around the people and civilian 
government—including the emperor—being victim to the military faction which seized power 
and embarked on an aggressive imperial campaign without letting the people know of the real 
extent of the military’s brutality overseas.  Despite international controversy over not trying 
Emperor Hirohito at the Tokyo Trials, Japanese people generally concur on Hirohito’s innocence.  
It is generally accepted that Hirohito became a mere figurehead after the military faction seized 
power.61  The Japanese collective saw themselves through the image of the emperor, who is the 
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1951, whereby he argued that the Japanese could be trusted more than the Germans because “[m]easured by the 
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direct descendant of the Sun Goddess.62  Through the emperor, the people can identify 
themselves as a nation extending all the way back to the beginning of the line of emperors.  
Through the emperor, the people can express their identity of cultural richness and morality.  
Therefore, it was cognitively straightforward to attach all blame of Japan’s aggression on the 
military faction, which became essentially classified as an intruder to Japanese authenticity.  
Thus, once that problematic thorn is “removed,” Japan can continue along its millennia-long path 
of “pacifism.”63  Japan’s embrace of victimhood and renouncement of its own military put Japan 
into a feminized position under the protection and influence of U.S. patriarchy.   
 U.S. Occupation policy significantly nurtured Japan’s adoption of victim consciousness 
and to relieve Emperor Hirohito of war responsibility.  In the immediate post-war period, 
American media reports humanized Hirohito and the Japanese people, while attributing all war 
responsibility to Tojo Hideki and his military faction.  The New York Times published articles 
including remarks made by Kido Koichi, one of Hirohito’s top advisors during the war, which 
emphasized that the emperor “knew nothing in advance about the Pearl Harbor attack, learning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
SCAP, was published in September 1946.  According to the textbook, it was the military that had dragged Japan into 
an unwanted war.” 
Yoshida, 47. 
“The main purpose of the trials envisioned by the Japanese was identical to a fundamental subpurpose of the Tokyo 
trial: to establish the emperor as peace, loving, innocent, and beyond politics…arguing that Japan had been led into 
“aggressive militarism” by a small cabal of irresponsible militaristic leaders.” 
Dower, 480. 
62An ex-general who had tremendous influence at the prosecution of his peers during the Tokyo trial explained that 
“his rationale for incriminating so many former colleagues was ‘to make the emperor innocent by not having him 
appear in the trial, and thus maintain the national polity.’” 
Ibid., 482-483. 
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Yoshida, 119-120.  
“[T]he most ubiquitous passive verb after the surrender was surely damasareta, “to have been deceived.” 
Dower, 491. 
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about it later from the palace radio.”64  American portrayal of the Tokyo Trial further centered on 
Tojo.65  Publications such as John Hersey’s report on Hiroshima helped to humanize the 
Japanese people with detailed narratives of six ordinary individuals who survived the bombing.66  
Perhaps there existed an element of U.S. war guilt in regard to atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, however, the escalating U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the aftermath of WWII likely influenced 
U.S. Occupation considerations.67  With the communist victory in China, it was important for the 
United States to build Japan into a strong American ally in Asia.68  Therefore, keeping Hirohito 
was important to rebuilding the fabric of society in the postwar devastation, as the emperor has 
for millennia represented the national essence of the Japanese people.  The Japanese textbook, 
The Course of the Nation approved by the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) and 
published in 1946, blamed the military for dragging Japan into an unwanted war.69   
 However, the strong-handed policies under U.S. Occupation including the imposition of 
the Constitution and content of education sowed the seeds for the rise of a conservative backlash 
as a response to a sense of Japanese injured masculinity. SCAP embarked on an effort to 
inculcate among the Japanese an American understanding of the Pacific War, which included the 
Japanese atrocities in Nanjing, through newspaper articles, national radio reports, and school 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64Yoshida, 73. 
65With regards to the Rape of Nanking, Matsui Iwane, the commander of the Central forces at the time of the 
massacre was among the seven who were sentenced to death at the Tokyo Trial.  Furthermore, “[t]he court ruled that 
Japanese soldiers killed 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war in six weeks of occupation and that approximately 
20,00 cases of rape occurred during the first month of the occupation.  This judgment of the Nanjing Massacre set in 
place the standard understanding of the event in Japanese postwar historiography, and SCAP prohibited any harsh 
criticisms of that judgment during occupation.” 
Ibid., 51. 
66Ibid., 76-77. 
67Eykholt, 21. 
68Pragmatists in Japan perceived that “the United States was eager to use Japan as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier.’” 
Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 32.  
69According to the textbook, “Although the government made every effort to end the incident and to maintain 
friendly relations with China, the military rapidly enlarged the fighting.” 
Yoshida, 47. 
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textbooks.  “In 1947, Allied advisors essentially dictated a new constitution to Japan’s leaders,” 
including Article 9 which prohibited Japan from maintaining a normal military force and 
relinquished its right to belligerency.70  In the words of John Dower, “Japan—only yesterday a 
menacing, masculine threat—had been transformed, almost in the blink of an eye into a 
compliant, feminine body on which the white victors could impose their will.”71  Emblematic of 
Japanese injured masculinity was MacArthur’s reference to Japan being “like a boy of twelve,” 
compared to the more advanced Western civilization.72  
 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1952) signed at the conclusion of Occupation officially 
tied Japan under the U.S. security umbrella and entrenched Japan’s dependency on the United 
States.   Under the Cold War context, with Japan under the U.S. sphere and China under the 
Soviet sphere, the two countries became enemies by default.  Japan was pressured to recognize 
the Republic of China in Taiwan, to sign a parallel peace treaty with the ROC to conclude the 
war and “to adhere to the rigorous American policy of isolating and economically containing the 
PRC.”73  Japan normalized relations with the PRC only after President Richard Nixon’s visit to 
the PRC in 1972.  Furthermore, in order to build Japan into a bulwark against communism in 
Asia, the United States moved quickly to remilitarize Japan, despite reluctance from the 
conservative government and the Japanese populace.74  To dissuade public fears of 
remilitarization, “[t]he ground forces, inaugurated in July 1950, were identified only as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70Eykholt, 24. 
71Dower, 139.  
72Ibid., 551. 
73Ibid., 552. 
74“By the fall of 1949, it was reliably reported that some five hundred former Japanese pilots were being recruited 
with SCAP’s support by the ousted Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan for possible assistance in retaking the 
mainland.” 
Ibid., 511. 
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‘National Police Reserve’ (NPR), and tanks rolled through their manuals as ‘special vehicles.’”75  
Moreover, on its path of economic recovery, Japan experienced its first economic boom based on 
“providing ‘special procurements’ for American forces fighting in Korea.”76 
 In the words of occupation era prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru, occupation “had left a 
‘thirty-eighth parallel’ running through the heart of Japanese people,” with two opposing groups 
contending for the future of defending Japan’s national essence.  On the left were the 
progressives who represented the new anti-military nationalism and “espoused allegiance to the 
original occupation ideals of ‘demilitarization and democratization.’”77  Progressives argued that 
Japan should repent for its wartime aggression by transferring its victimhood from the atomic 
bombings to internalizing the overall cruelty of war and to subsequently “become a champion of 
a non-militarized, non-nuclearized world.”78  On the right were the conservative politicians, 
bureaucrats, and business interests that the Americans supported and embraced under Cold War 
considerations.  Essentially, power (both political and economic) in Japan reverted back to the 
wartime elite.79   
 The two sides appeared to agree on rebuilding Japan as a nation of science and rationality, 
albeit for arguably different reasons.  The progressives viewed science as a way to further 
espouse peace and renounce militarization and the rationality that comes with science as a way to 
prevent an ideological (particularly, of the militaristic genre) arrest of the government as had 
happened during the Showa era.  In an idealistic sense, the progressives linked science with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75Ibid., 547. 
76Ibid., 528.  
77Ibid., 554. 
78Ibid., 493. 
79“The economic and other wartime leaders who had been prohibited from holding public office were gradually 
‘depurged,’ while on the other side of the coin, the radical left was subjected to the ‘Red purges.’” 
Ibid., 525. 
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democracy.  The conservatives led a successful effort to capitalize on the security arrangement 
with the United States to rebuild Japanese nationalism through scientific development and 
economic growth.  In the wake of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
conservatives interpreted Japan as having “lost to the enemy’s science.”80  “In a speech to young 
people, Education Minister Maeda explained that ‘the cultivation of scientific thinking ability’ 
was key to ‘the construction of a Japan of culture.’”81  As demonstrated by the 500 million yen 
diverted from previous military funds in order to promote science soon after Japanese surrender, 
science will replace military power as the mechanism for defending Japan’s national essence and 
regaining masculinity.82  To the West, the “little men were transformed into economic ‘miracle 
men’ and ‘supermen’ almost overnight” in the 1960s, when Japanese automobiles and electronic 
products poured into the West and came to compete with Western-produced goods.83   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80Ibid., 494. 
81Ibid., 495. 
82Ibid., 495. 
83Ibid., 557. 
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“People of all the nations of the world absolutely should not abandon the right to initiate wars of 
self-defense.”         --Tojo Hideki84 
Part 3: Contemporary Relations 
Rise of China and Patriotic Education: 
 After Mao’s death in 1976, the floodgate of government criticism opened and in the early 
1990s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched the “Patriotic Education Campaign” to 
invigorate nationalism in order to reestablish its legitimacy.  The Party felt particularly 
threatened after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, leading President Deng Xiaoping to “conclude that 
the biggest mistake for the CCP in the 1980s was that the party did not focus enough attention on 
ideological education.”85  The Patriotic Education Campaign was designed to project the Party as 
the protector of China’s national sovereignty and the redeemer of its “century of humiliation.”86  
It was a concerted effort by top Party officials to arouse Chinese popular nationalism by harking 
back to China’s victimhood under the imperial legacy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.  The Chinese nation came to be portrayed as a victim, a victim of imperialism as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84Ibid., 461. 
85Morris Low, “Competing Masculinities in Modern Japan,” in . Asian Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of 
Manhood in China and Japan, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 90.  
The CCP needed to open a space for the people to express their dissatisfaction; they needed to channel the people’s 
dissatisfaction away from the Party.   
Zhao, 8. 
In the 1980s, student demonstrations in Beijing and the rest of the country used “anti-Japanese feelings as a pretext 
to voice their anger against the Communist Party, which they felt was unresponsive to the sentiments and needs of 
the Chinese people.”  
Eykholt, 39 
“Fraud, embezzlement, and corruption within the Party were specific complaints, and students wanted a greater 
public voice in the affairs of the nation.  A general complaint was that after thirty-five years of Communist rule, 
China was still a backward country.” 
Ibid., 38.   
86The “century of humiliation” generally refers to the period between Qing defeat in the First Opium War in 1839 
and the expulsion of the Western imperialists after 1945 or the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949.  
Some argue that the humiliation cannot be fully redeemed without the return of Taiwan.   
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations  
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 3, 50. 
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captured by the saying, “勿忘国耻”, or “never forget national humiliation.”87  The victimhood 
can be understood as the de-masculinization of the state and the state taking on a subsequent 
injured masculinity mentality as it seeks to regain China’s loss of masculinity.  An event that 
became iconic in the representation of national humiliation was the Rape of Nanking.88  
Throughout China, textbooks and war memorials all came to emphasize the “official” death toll 
of the massacre and to portray how Japan has continued to fail to rightfully acknowledge and 
apologize for its transgressions against the Chinese nation.89  Japan became the archetypal 
victimizer in the China-as-victim rhetoric.90 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87The notion of national humiliation is entrenched through stories that help to forge national identity by reaching 
back through China’s long history.  National humiliation has become embodied by the folk legend behind the idiom 
of Woxin changdan (卧薪尝胆), meaning “sleeping on brushwood and tasting gall.” The story involves the defeat 
and capture of King Goujian of the kingdom of Yue by the kingdom of Wu during the Spring and Autumn period of 
Chinese history.  “Upon being granted his freedom, Goujian returned to Yue and rebuilt his military.  To never 
forget the humiliation he suffered during his defeat, Goujian exchanged his silk-padded bedding for a pile of 
brushwood and hung a gall-bladder from the ceiling in his room; he forced himself to taste the gall-bladder every 
day before having dinner and going to bed.  By imposing such measures of suffering upon himself, Goujian 
reinvigorated his strength and ultimately conquered Wu twenty years later.” 
Ibid., 230-231.   
88Michael Berry, A History of Pain: Trauma in Modern Chinese Literature and Film (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 169.   
89“The official People’s Education Press published new history textbooks for middle and high schools in 1992.  The 
focus of the new books was on the foreign powers’ invasions and oppressions.  The narrative of the Anti-Japanese 
War has also been revised.  The emphasis is placed on the international and ethnic conflict between China and Japan, 
rather than the internal and class conflict between the CCP and KMT.” 
Wang, 102.   
The Memorial for Compatriot Victims of the Japanese Military’s Nanjing Massacre in Nanjing opened on August 15, 
1985.  “Upon first entering, the visitor faces a stone wall with ‘VICTIMS 300,000’ inscribed on it, showing the 
central importance of this death total to Chinese representations.” 
Eykholt, 34. 
90“Many Chinese consider the greatest humiliation during the century of humiliation to be China’s defeat by Japan, a 
former tributary and vassal state.” 
Wang, 54. 
“The names of tens of thousands of victims are written on the wall spaces between the display of bones, invoking 
feelings of loss, destruction, and humiliation.  Exiting, the visitor once again walks along the stone field.  The 
revolutionary statue is central to all of this, adding a heroic overtone to the loss, tying everything to China’s 
revolutionary victory and, by extension the Communist Party.  There is no individuality or obvious political division.  
Instead the feeling is communal and collective.  These are displays for all people, commemorating at time when the 
motherland suffered before uniting under the Communist leadership to stand up to its enemies.” 
Eykholt, 35. 
“Every year in August on the anniversary of Japan’s surrender and again in December on the anniversary of 
Nanjing’s fall, newspaper articles and public gatherings ritualize the Massacre and rekindle hatred for Japan’s 
wartime deeds.  Today, Chinese continue to view Japan’s actions as an unprovoked and unconscionable attempt to 
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 The patriotic education and narrative emphasis on victimhood permeated across Chinese 
society, proliferating in popular films and literature.  In China, all books, films, and media go 
through an approval process or are at least under surveillance by the Propaganda Department of 
the CCP (later, changed its name to the Publicity Department in English).  In 2004, Beijing 
implemented a project called the Three One Hundred for Patriotic Education, whereby a hundred 
each of “films, songs and books with a common theme of patriotism” are to be created and 
recommended to the whole society.91  The sustained patriotic education campaign implemented 
through various prisms of people’s lives contributes to the institutionalization and entrenchment 
of ideas of patriotic nationalism.  In the 1980s and 1990s, as people collectively sought to search 
for national identity, so-called “root-searching” works of literature proliferated, whereby themes 
of searching for “real man” and “concern for the degeneration of manhood” were conveyed.92 
 The film portrayals of the Nanjing Massacre helped to elevate the tragedy as a symbol of 
the rape of the Chinese nation.93  The influence of these films cannot be overlooked, as they 
often become blockbusters within China.  One of the most recent films on the Rape of Nanking 
is The Flowers of War, directed by one of the most acclaimed Chinese directors, Zhang Yimou 
and starred the American actor, Christian Bale. The film became the top-grossing Chinese film 
of 2011.94  Another recent film on the topic, City of Life and Death won Best Director and best 
Cinematographer at the 4th Asian Film Awards.95  Moreover, Michael Berry argues that “[i]n the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exterminate the Chinese spirit.” 
Ibid., 12. 
91Wang, 109. 
92Yang, 56.  
93Zhao, 79. 
94Pamela McClintock, “Box Office Report: Christian Bale’s ‘Flowers of War’ Already Top-Grossing Chinese Film 
of 2011,” The Hollywood Reporter, December 30, 2011, accessed April 2, 2013, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/christian-bale-flowers-of-war-dark-knight-china-box-office-277004.  
95Jonathan Landreth, “Lu Chuan’s ‘City of Life and Death’ Gets 11-City U.S. Tour in May,” The Hollywood 
Reporter, April 15, 2011, accessed April 2, 2013, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/lu-chuans-city-life-
death-179012.  
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case of the Rape of Nanking, it is only through an intricate series of literary and historical 
trajectories that intersect and intertwine that the elusive specter of history comes alive.”96  The 
very overt portrayals of rape of virgin schoolgirls by perverted Japanese soldiers in popular films 
such as The Flowers of War contribute to the effort to personalize the tragedy and feelings of 
national humiliation in each individual.  The Flowers of War exemplifies the notion of women as 
embodying the national essence; particularly virgin girls.97  The story is based around different 
groups of people working together to save the virgin schoolgirls from being violated and being 
killed.  These different groups include the Westerner (or perhaps, more specifically, the 
American), the prostitutes, Chinese soldiers, young boys, and the pro-Japanese collaborators 
(hanjian).98   The story empowers individuals from entire range of the cross-section of Chinese 
society to unite and take action to safeguard China’s national essence; merely the soldier’s (or 
the Chinese military’s) effort is not enough.   
 The patriotic education campaign has also opened up the space for personal and family 
memories of World War II to be expressed.  These personal memories include memories of the 
political leaders.  In December 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao touched on his war memories at a 
reception dinner given by Secretary of State Colin Powell: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96Berry, 178. 
97“Women’s ordeals of loyalty and fidelity thus do not set them apart from men, but the characteristics of the female 
body gave it unique possibilities as a theater for the drama of virtue.  Women’s breasts, providing essential 
nourishment, could be offered in filial service.  Penetrable, woman’s body was a site where the drama of resistance 
to invasion could be acted out.  Weaker, it could shame men unwilling to rise to the same heights of virtue.  
Procreative, it was a resource to be sold or controlled.  Attractive, it offered opportunities to men to prove their 
moral worth by exercising self-restraint.  There were four didactic Ming story types that seem to have made an 
unambiguously correct use of this theater of virtue, curbing dangerous desire and exalting loyalty, hierarchy, and the 
appropriate separation of the sexes.  The four are stories of filial piety, virginity, resistance to remarriage, and 
resistance to rape.” 
Christina K. Gilmartin, Gail Hershatter, Lisa Rofel, and Tyrene White, eds.  Engendering China: Women, Culture, 
and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 111. 
98In the development of modern Chinese nationalism, prostitution was often cast as a vice characteristic of “old” 
Chinese traditions which were used to explain China’s political vulnerability during the century of humiliation.  
Movements to strengthen China involved getting rid these old vices.   
Ibid., 160.   
Flowers of War, DVD, directed by Zhang Yimou (China, 2011). 
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 It is very difficult to understand someone’s thinking and to know this person without 
knowing his growth experience.  I was born during China’s Anti-Japanese War.  I can never 
forget the scene when I huddled against my mother stood in front of the bayonets of Japanese 
soldiers.  My hometown was all burned up, including the primary school that my grandpa ran.  
If my American friends would ask me about my political beliefs, I can tell you clearly and 
definitely, I myself and my people will use our own hands to build my country well.99 
The feedback loop between these personal memories and official memory that has spun the wave 
of heightened popular nationalism in China since the 1990s and importantly, gender 
embodiments play a role.100  Memory is constantly being reconstructed.  The complete 
monopolization of history production by the state during the post-war era, under Mao Zedong 
undermined the production and transmission of authentic personal memories of survivors.  By 
the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping loosened the state’s grip on Chinese society, many of the 
survivors from the Nanjing Massacre had passed away and so much time had passed.  Research 
shows the difficulties associated with recovering memories even of traumatic events.  As a result, 
there is a tendency for an individual’s memories to blend with current events and indoctrination 
and produce results with varying degrees of authenticity.  Thus, memory can often display 
confirmation bias.  Personal confirmation of national humiliation can be found in family 
memories and incites feelings of nationalism that seemingly stem from an internal locus of 
control.  This perception of an internal locus of control empowers individuals to take action and 
seek personal redress.101   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99Wang, 139. 
100“Scalapino suggests that the emergence of Chinese nationalism occurred simultaneously from the top down, 
through the action of the state, and from the bottom up, through the will of the nation.” 
Zhao, 14. 
101“Western scholars have found memory is often quite resilient after years of repression, but it also is subject to 
distortion, both willful and unconscious.” 
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 From my interviews with Chinese nationals currently around the ages of 21 or 22 (i.e. 
they were born in 1990 or 1991), they express annoyance and frustration towards Japan’s 
unsatisfactory acknowledgement of history and emphasize the importance of remembering 
history and getting a sincere apology.  Those whose families are from the most affected areas 
from Japanese occupation (Nanjing and Manchuria) expressed stories of atrocities transmitted by 
family members.  The following is a fairly moderate response that I received, “In my opinion, 
the Japanese killed so many innocent people in that event [i.e. the Rape of Nanking], did a lot of 
sins to Chinese people. The history is clear and well-proved. Current Japanese government 
should have [a] correct understanding of that unpleasant period of history, apologize to the 
relatives of victims, deal with the bilateral issues in [a] proper way, and do some good things to 
develop the relationship between our two countries.”102  
 The Rape of Nanking is an event where individuals can expediently attach gendered 
binary constructs to allow for an arguably, simplified yet powerful understanding and memory of 
Chinese victimhood and Japanese perpetration, allowing the Chinese state to recapture its 
legitimacy based upon reviving masculinized Chinese humiliation from continued Japanese 
wronging.  Ideas are more easily internalized when we can see clearly an example and then a 
complete counterexample, as is the case in binary constructs.  Taking it a step further, feminism 
argues that these binary constructs are never gender neutral (though often claimed as), but rather 
exhibit hetero-normative bias.103  In a way, the more explicitly gendered, the binary construct, 
the more it can be easily popularly understood because of the hetero-normative norms that have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Yang, 141-144. 
102Individual A.  
See Appendix A. 
103For instance, hetero-normatively speaking, “perpetrator” tends to invoke a “male” connotation, while “victim” 
tends to invoke a “female” connotation.  One can also argue that “good vs. evil” also evokes a similar line of 
connotations. 
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been established in our society.  As a result of the powerful simplicity of gendered narratives, 
they tend to be very effective at arousing popular nationalism.  The narrative of the “century of 
humiliation” from Western imperialism has become simplified, culminating on Japan as the 
ultimate victimizer of China.  Chinese education emphasizes how a country that has failed to 
properly remember history and rightfully repent its past transgressions will inevitably repeat its 
actions.  Chinese people have become adamant about receiving a sincere apology from Japan and 
unyielding to any signs of Japanese remilitarization.   
Japan, Economic Underperformance and Growth of Neo-nationalism: 
 Japan’s postwar economic miracle formed the basis of newfound national pride that 
strengthened the conservative influence in Japan, including the return of the idea of being a 
superior race.  A 1979 book by a Harvard professor, titled, “Japan as Number,” generated alarm 
in the West and fascination with discerning the root of Japan’s miraculous economic rise.  By the 
1980s, Japan had become the second largest economy in the world, right behind the United 
States, from a “country that only recently had lain in ruins and been dismissed as a ‘fourth-rate 
nation.’”  Critics both outside of and within Japan pointed to “the country’s deep history and 
traditional values” in explaining the Japanese model.  Japanese people became increasingly 
interested in understanding the meaning of “being Japanese,” as people saw newfound pride for 
the “Yamato spirit.”104  The image of the emperor transformed to being “a man of science” and 
“Japanese soldiers were transformed into salarymen and factory workers.”105  This newfound 
pride laid the foundation in the growth of today’s neo-nationalism that seeks to break with 
Japan’s neighbor countries’ memory of Japan as the wartime aggressor.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104Dower, 557. 
105Morris Low, “Competing Masculinities in Modern Japan,” in Asian Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of 
Manhood in China and Japan, ed. Kam Louie et al. (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 96. 
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 The flipside of the tremendous economic success is Japan’s powerlessness in terms of 
being able to carry out sovereign foreign policy due to continued de-masculinization from its 
security agreement with the United States and Article 9.  Although being under the U.S. umbrella 
was helpful for Japan’s postwar economic recovery, the constraint on being able to conduct 
independent foreign policy is increasing seen as a nuisance in Japan.  The Self Defense Forces 
generates a sense of de-masculinization for Japanese society and entrenches U.S. patriarchy upon 
Japan as it is completely modeled after the U.S. military forces.106  Being put under U.S. shield 
allowed Japan to take on a pacifist national identity.  While, “in many senses, the salaryman, 
reflected in the term kigyo senshi (‘corporate warrior’) that was used to describe the salarymen 
who supposedly bore Japan’s ‘Economic Miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s on their shoulders, 
appeared to replace the soldier as the new masculine ideal,” Japanese people increasingly seek to 
become a ‘normal’ state.107  Plans to revise Article 9 were expressed in the Liberal Democratic 
Party platform in its most recent and successful presidential bid in 2012.108  Additionally, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106This de-masculinization is reflected in the complicated views on masculinity in Japanese society.  In today’s 
Japan, hetero-normative masculine qualities such as being physically strong and athletic are not popularly upheld.  
“The masculinity of the ‘big, strong, and smelly’ rugby players lies in stark contrast to the masculinity of the pale, 
slight boys wearing eye makeup and carrying expensive designer handbags in the Shinjuku.”  In Richard Light’s 
study, these male high school rugby players on the one hand “recognized that theirs was a form of masculinity that 
was increasingly out of touch with modern youth culture in Japan” and on the other hand, “seemed to feel that they 
were sacrificing popularity with girls to uphold the ideal of being a ‘real’ man in Japan.” 
Richard Light, “Sport and the Construction of Masculinity,” in Asian Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of 
Manhood in China and Japan, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003),113.  
Peter J. Katzensten, Cultural Norms and National Security: Policy and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 102. 
“In the 1980s, Davis Bobrow reports, a leading Japanese international affairs analyst could calmly describe the Self-
Defense Forces as ‘a piece of furniture that any modern house or nation has, a chair for the American visitor to sit 
on.’” 
Katzensten, 100. 
107Romit Dasgupta, ”Creating Corporate Warriors: The ‘salaryman’ and masculinity in Japan,” in Asian 
Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of Manhood in China and Japan, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 122. 
A ‘normal’ sovereign state, meaning one that has the right to keep a military and to declare war. 
108“As prime minister in 2006-2007, Abe made revising the 1947 constitution a key part of a drive to shed a U.S.-
imposed ‘post-war regime’ that conservatives say weakened traditional values and fostered too apologetic a view of 
Japan’s wartime history.” 
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areas of Japan where U.S. military bases are located, there are increasing levels of complaint by 
the locals about the conduct of U.S. military base officers.109  Today’s generation in Japan 
increasingly view the existence of U.S. bases on Japanese soil as an affront to their sovereignty.   
 Strong right-wing tendencies in contemporary Japan seek to fully regain Japanese 
masculinity by shedding the “U.S.-imposed post-war regime.”110  Japanese neoconservatives 
such as Tokyo University Professor Nobukatsu Fujioka, assert that Japanese were “brainwashed 
by United States to accept the ‘Tokyo War Crimes Trials view of history.’”111  Fujioka is 
representative of the neoconservatives who assert that education should be about invigorating 
patriotism and national pride: 
 “I am completely opposed to having the Japanese state branded a sex criminal,” Fujioka said.  
Children who study history texts that portray Japan as an “evil” and “barbaric” country “will 
surely despise Japanese history, hate Japan and look upon Japanese people [including 
themselves] with contempt,” he argued.112 
Moreover, the growing influence of the right-wing in Japan demonstrates a Japan that 
increasingly feels its masculinity threatened by its economic recession from the 1990s and a 
rapidly growing China.  The underperforming economy and changing demographics in Japan has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Linda Sieg, “Analysis: Japan’s Abe get second chance at loosening limits on military,” Reuters, December 22, 2012, 
accessed April 2, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-japan-election-constitution-
idUSBRE8BA06O2012121.  
109“a 1995 rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S. soldiers galvanized the anti-base movement.” 
John Feffer, “Japan: The Price of Normalcy,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 2 no. 9 (2009), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-John-Feffer/3009#. 
110Sieg. 
111Sonni Efron, “Defender of Japan’s War Past,” Los Angeles Times, May 9, 1997, accessed April 2, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1997-05-09/news/mn-57094_1_gulf-war. 
112“Despite his controversial views, Fujioka is not a fringe character.  His allies include 62 lawmakers from Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s Liberal Democratic Party; some conservatives from the opposition; the Sankei 
newspaper, one of Japan’s largest dailies; more than 60 opinion leaders, including prominent writers, critics, 
psychoanalysts, and academics; a famous comic-book author who has launched an Internet home page to promote 
Fujioka’s agenda; some members of an archconservative Shinto religious group; and senior executives of the blue-
ribbon Fujitsu and Ajinomoto companies.” 
Ibid. 
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led to the gradual demise of the strict postwar sarariiman/sengyo-shufu (“salaryman/housewife”) 
regime whereby “the husband is accustomed to demanding the services and attention of his 
indulgent housewife in an authoritarian manner.”113  China’s rapid economic rise—overtaking 
Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010—threatens Japan’s regional and global 
economic position.114  A public opinion survey conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office in 2011 
shows an overall steady increase in Japanese people’s positive impression of the SDF and 
expression of the need “to adopt education to instill feelings of protecting the country” since the 
early 1990s.115   
With its regional and global power increasingly threatened by China’s rise and its 
declining economy, Japan has moved to embrace a more patriotic education and seeks to rebuild 
its masculinity by casting off its own stigma as a wartime aggressor, allowing for possible 
normalization (or legalized remilitarization).  “By the late 1990s, the Liberal Democratic Party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113“Japan’s Economy Shrinks in 4th Quarter, Stays in Recession,” The Associated Press, February 14, 2013, accesed 
March 5, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201302140026.  
“Even though the salaryman model still has a powerful influence on the perception of masculinity in Japan, its 
hegemony has been threatened by recent economic and demographic changes that have called unto question the 
necessity of male breadwinning and domination over women…Likewise in the home, the status of salarymen as 
husbands and fathers is increasingly ambivalent.” 
Futoshi Taga, “Life Histories of Japanese Male Youth,” Asian Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of 
Manhood in China and Japan, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 138-139. 
114“In an opinion poll of the general public by the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1997, 74% responded that China’s economic 
power will pose a great or some threat [to Japan], and in another poll in 1995, 37% thought that China will have 
more economic power than Japan and become Asia’s biggest economic power.  In 1995 a Nikkei-Dow Jones poll 
found that 16% of Japanese already regarded China as the strongest economic power in the world, compared to 5% 
of Americans.  In the future, 66% of Japanese saw China as the strongest economic power, compared to only 17% of 
Americans.” 
Drifte, 148. 
“Compared to other Asians, Chinese are most hostile to a Japanese leadership role in Asia.  In an opinion poll with 
business executives and academics in the Asia-Pacific region (eleven countries, including Taiwan and Hong Kong), 
it turned out that 70.2% in all the eleven Asian countries agreed to a leading Japanese role, but only 16.2% did so in 
China and 43.3% in South Korea.” 
Ibid., 154. 
115James Simpson, “Post-Disaster Opinion: China and the SDF,” Japan Security Watch, New Pacific Institute, 
March 17, 2012, accessed March 5, 2013, http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10040.  
“Public Opinion Survey on Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (“自衛隊・防衛問題に関する世論調査”),  
Cabinet Office of Japan (内閣府大臣官房政府広報室), accessed April 2, 2013. 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h23/h23-bouei/index.html. 
The Cabinet Office oversees the daily affairs of the Cabinet and is officially headed by the Prime Minister. 
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and the Ministry of Education embarked upon a patriotic education campaign reminiscent of the 
early 1980s, with the aim of reclaiming control over history (and other) textbooks.”  In 1999, the 
Education Ministry pressured textbook publishers to ensure “more balance” in textbooks and to 
increase emphasis on “respect for national symbols, specifically the national flag and anthem.”  
Middle school history textbooks screened under this campaign toned down the Nanjing Massacre 
by referring to it as the “Nanjing Incident” and replaced the term “invade” (shinryaku) with 
“advance” (shinshutsu) in regard to Japan’s campaign in China during the Second World War.116  
Moreover, “the word ‘rape’ was not always allowed by the Ministry of Education.”  These 
changes work to tone down the perception of Japan as a predacious aggressor that cannot be 
entrusted with military power.117 
From my interviews with Japanese nationals currently around the ages of 21 or 22 (i.e. 
they were born in 1990 or 1991), many express negativity with regards to China’s “anti-Japan” 
patriotic education program and view history issues such as the Nanjing Massacre having 
become increasingly politicized by China.  On the Nanjing Massacre, a student recounts, “[the 
issue of Japanese apology] is [an increasingly] difficult problem because [the] Chinese 
Government under [the] Chinese Communist Party uses a strategy of anti-Japan educational 
policy to avoid citizen's criticism or protest movement against the Chinese Communist Party.”118  
Another individual expresses that “[t]here are some people who do not acknowledge the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2005), 60. 
117Ibid., 58. 
This effort became referred to as the “third textbook offensive,” attracting tremendous criticism both domestically 
and from abroad (notably China and South Korea).  One of the most controversial components included the approval 
of the Atarashii rekishi kyokasho (New history textbook), a work produced by the radical right-wing group, Tsukuru 
kai.  Many members of the group claim that the comfort women system did not exist at all, or else was not 
implemented by the state. 
Ibid., 59. 
118Individual B. 
See Appendix A. 
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incidence, yet the majority of the citizens admit the existence of the massacre. Howsoever, quite 
a few share an opinion that there are some fabrications and false data in the view proclaimed by 
Chinese authority.”119  The effect of Japan’s patriotic education campaign in the late 1990s is 
also evident as one individual recalled that in the sixth grade, the history textbook had mentioned 
that 300,000 people in were killed in Nanjing by Japanese soldiers, yet “[i]n high school, 
description about the massacre was decreased and changed.  Only a footnote of a page mentioned 
it, and the number of casualty was decreased [to] approximately 60,000.”120  The individual who 
confessed that his views might be considered “radical right wing,” agreed with the Japanese 
government’s effort to “not teach uncertain incidents, which lead to looking down on our 
country.”121  
In addition to China’s rapid economic growth in recent years, its increasing assertiveness 
in foreign policy ensure Japan’s refusal to acquiescent to Chinese government demands for 
Japanese apology over history, as both countries seek to convey masculine strength to their 
domestic citizenry.  This rivalry is further complicated by Japan’s alliance with the United States 
and the global rivalry between the United States and China, which includes Beijing’s opaque 
leadership and U.S. China policy that oscillates from engagement to containment based on its 
perception of Beijing’s motivations.  “Kojima Tomoyuki dates this shift towards discussing 
China as a big power and potential threat to around summer 1993.  The U.S. shift from viewing 
Japan as the new threat after the demise of the Soviet Union to seeing China instead as the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119Individual C.  
See Appendix A. 
120Individual C. 
See Appendix A. 
121Individual C. 
See Appendix A.  
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major threat has certainly contributed to this change in Japan.”122  China’s rise also couples with 
its growing importance for the United States both in terms of contention and cooperation.  Not 
only does Japan fear entrapment in a U.S. security strategy against China, but it fears 
abandonment by the United States.  Japan continues to view U.S. normalization of relations with 
China in 1972 “without prior consultation with Japan” as a form of abandonment and harbors 
insecurity over U.S. commitment to Japan.123  Moreover, Beijing has taken on increasingly 
unfriendly stances against Japan in order to improve its regional dominance vis-à-vis Japan and 
as a mechanism to undermine U.S. supremacy.  “In 1998 China opposed a US proposal to invite 
Japan to a conference of nuclear powers in Geneva to work out a strategy after the nuclear tests 
by India and Pakistan” and China has repeatedly refused Tokyo’s request for support of its bid 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.124  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122“Mainstream authors [in Japan] express concern about China’s military modernization, the rise in military 
expenditures, the issues of missiles (increase, export, testing), the development of an ocean-going navy (implications 
for China’s territorial demands) and the general influence of the People’s Liberation Army on China’s politics.” 
Drifte, 80-82. 
123“In 1999 newly declassified US documents disclosed that in 1972 President Nixon and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai 
discussed Chinese concerns about Japan increasing its influence in Taiwan and other Asian countries as a result of 
US withdrawal from some parts of Asia.” 
Ibid., 162-163. 
124Ibid., 151.    
The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Russia, and China.  Each of them has the power to veto; therefore a full consensus is required for the adoption of a 
resolution, such as adding another state to the Council.   
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Part 4: Civil Society and Reconciliation 
Incomplete reconciliation is an important factor in causing continued tensions in Sino-
Japanese bilateral relations.  Andrew Rigby emphasizes the importance of the active 
participation of those who “suffered directly (or their representatives)” in successful 
reconciliation.  As a result, feminist international relations theory has much to contribute to 
reconciliation politics as opposed to realism and liberalism, with their emphasis on states and 
international institutions, respectively.   
 State and institutional level reconciliation has notably failed in achieving complete 
reconciliation for China and Japan.  Caroline Rose breaks down the reconciliation efforts into 
two cycles.  Rose characterizes the first cycle as being the early post-war period through the 
Cold War.  The governments in essence monopolized the attempts at reconciliation.  “This 
involved attempts to reveal the truth and provide justice through the International Military 
Tribunal in the Far East (IMTFE) and other war crimes trials held in China, to agree upon war 
reparations (which were waived by the PRC in 1972), and to settle the past (that is, provide 
apologies and a reflection on Japan’s wartime activities) through the agreements signed in the 
1970s (the Joint Statement of 1972, and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978).”125  
However, by the 1980s, as Chinese society became more open with Deng Xiaoping’s reform 
policies, “the inadequacies, partiality, omissions, and even injustices of earlier settlements were 
becoming apparent.”126  The continued bilateral tensions with periodic flare-ups caused by 
incomplete reconciliation with issues such as textbook debates and shrine-visits by Japanese 
officials demonstrate the failure of the state-level reconciliation described in Rose’s first cycle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125Rose, 24. 
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attempted reconciliation.  Similarly, international institutions have also failed to effectively step 
in and bring forth complete reconciliation.  Again, international institutions such as the IMTFE 
failed to deliver sufficient reconciliation, as they can often become captured by the interests of 
the most powerful states.   
In line with Cynthia Enloe’s assertion that all politics is personal, non-governmental 
individuals and groups in China, Japan, and the United States have increasing bearing on 
interstate relations.   Not only are states constrained in their policy choices from passionate 
public pressures, individuals are taking it into their own hands to seek to redress and 
reconciliation.  Arguably, true reconciliation can only be achieved through these transnational 
civilian channels.  First, individuals have already become empowered in their internalized 
understanding of both personal and collective injured masculinity.  Thus, individuals desire to 
take personal action and gain redress for themselves and their nation.  Moreover, while states are 
ultimately largely constrained by self-help and realpolitik tendencies as a result of the anarchic 
structure of the international system, individuals undergoing transnational engagements remain 
under the protection of their governments and can thus express more culturally nuanced and 
emotive forms of engagement which help to foster a better understanding between two countries 
over time.  Especially for two countries with very different political systems, there can be “a 
failure to grant full legitimacy to the other system and the delay in developing common interests,” 
civilian actors can help to mediate interstate relations in the medium to long term.127 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127“This difference also became apparent in the much earlier reconciliation of Germany with Western countries than 
was the case with countries under Communist rule in Eastern Europe.” 
Drifte, 15.  
Through civilian engagement, mutual understanding can be rekindled.  Japan and China do share similar cultural 
and linguistic heritages.  If better mutual understanding can be reached, then balance of threat activity can be 
mitigated if it is determined that the other state does not have intentions that are fundamentally conflicting or 
malevolent.  During the height of Pax Brittannica, the United States allied with Great Britain and as the power 
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In addition to its hard power, the United States also exerts influence on the Sino-Japanese 
reconciliation dialogue through its vociferous civilian actors.  Iris Chang’s book, The Rape of 
Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, catapulted the massacre and Japanese 
wartime atrocities to an unprecedented global spotlight in the late 1990s.  Her book remained on 
the New York Times Bestsellers for ten weeks immediately after its release in 1997.  For many 
Americans it was the first time that they became aware of the WWII atrocities in China and of 
the stories behind them.  As an American of Chinese decent, she was versed in Mandarin and 
travelled to Nanjing to interview survivors, among conducting other forms of research on the 
massacre.128  “In a bizarre twist, Chang has come under attack not only from Japanese 
ultranationalists--who assert that the 1937 massacre of Chinese civilians by Japanese troops 
never took place--but also from Japanese liberals, who insist it happened but allege that Chang's 
flawed scholarship damages their cause.”  In stirring such controversy, the book reignited 
interest in the topic among both progressives and right-wing nationalists in Japan, and has 
sparked interest on the topic globally, particularly also in China and the United States.  Chang 
gave the issue a new life of its own, internationally.129    No longer is it a bilateral issue, but an 
issue of a crime against humanity.  Though Chang’s book and active advocacy for Japanese 
apology boosts the CCP patriotic education position, perhaps more importantly her work 
empowered the individuals who witnessed and survived the tragedy and the anti-war activists in 
Japan.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
distributions shifted by the end of WWI, grand power shifted to the United States with the two countries continuing 
to share what some refer to as a “special relationship,” as a result of shared history and language ties.   
128Eykholt, 55. 
129However, during this period, revisionist works by figures such as the Tokyo University education professor 
became much more popular than the more academically respected studies. 
“a well-respected 1997 study of the Nanjing massacre by historian Tokushi Kasahara recently sold 55,000 copies--a 
huge hit for a Japanese academic book, but nowhere near the 1.2 million sales for the tomes of revisionist Tokyo 
University education professor Nobukatsu Fujioka.” 
Sonni Efron, “War Again is Raging Over Japan’s Role in ‘Nanking’,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1999, accessed 
April 2, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jun/06/news/mn-44838. 
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 In China, she has become memorialized as somewhat of a martyr.  She is compared to 
Minnie Vautrin, the American missionary who stayed behind in Nanjing and saved many lives 
through unwavering efforts at safeguarding the Ginling Women’s College as a safety zone.  
Vautrin committed suicide soon after returning to the United States in 1941.  In 2004, Chang 
committed suicide at the age of 36.  The Chinese government pledged to build two statues in 
commemoration of Chang, “for her exposure of ‘atrocities committed by Japanese aggressors’ in 
China and the spirit to ‘dig up the historical truth.’”130  One statue will be placed in the Nanjing 
Massacre Memorial Hall in Nanjing and the other statue will be donated to Chang’s family in the 
United States.131  By engaging with individual survivors, Chang touched their lives in 
immeasurable ways, giving their stories a voice that resounds internationally.132  Moreover, 
books and documentaries about her have been released in English and Chinese since her death.  
Her mother, Ying-Ying Chang a retired professor of microbiology, has dedicated herself to carry 
on her daughter’s spirit; last year she gave a talk at Fudan University in Shanghai regarding her 
newly published memoir on her daughter’s life and her message of “the power of one.”133  By 
helping to internationalize or trans-nationalize the issue, Chang is an example of a non-state 
actor who has contributed to shaping the understanding of Japanese wartime aggression and thus, 
the Sino-Japanese reconciliation dialogue.    
Civil society groups in China and Japan are also contributing to the reconciliation process.  
Rapid growth of civil society in China and Japan began during the 1990s, whereby civil society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130“Statues to remember former AP reporter Iris Chang,” Xinhua News, June 22, 2005, < 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/22/content_3116925.htm>. 
131Ibid.  
132Kathleen McLaughlin, “Iris Chang’s suicide stunned those she tried so hard to help—the survivors of Japan’s 
‘Rape of Nanking,’” San Francisco Chronicle, November 20, 2004, accessed April 5, 2013, 
http://www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/Iris-Chang-s-suicide-stunned-those-she-tried-so-2634180.php. 
133石剑峰, “有些人的一生专为别人而度过,” 东方早报，dfdaily.com, May 18, 2012, 
http://www.dfdaily.com/html/150/2012/5/18/793508.shtml. 
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is defined as “a spontaneous, concerned group of citizens who interact independently of 
government, while collaborating with it at certain times and opposing it at others.”134  While 
Caroline Rose attributes the relatively late development of civil society in Japan to traditional 
Japanese governance and society, whereby the officialdom provided the public goods and acted 
in the public interest and the masses largely pursued private interest within the governmental 
framework, this explanation can arguably also be applied for China’s case of civil society 
development.135  However, in China there exist greater legal and political barriers to the 
development of genuine civil society groups under authoritarian rule.  Though the activities of 
civil groups in China continue to be restricted, the space for growth came during Deng’s 
initiation of China’s “opening up and reform.”  Furthermore, new technologies such as the 
Internet fostered an unprecedented space for ideas exchange and social networking across great 
distances.136 
 The renewed interest in the war (described as “the memory boom of the 1980s and 
1990s”) and opened space for societal input has allowed for the growth of ideas beyond a 
simplistic antagonistic nationalism that, for instance, the Chinese state has attempted to construct 
with the patriotic education campaign.  While there is increasingly patriotic and assertive popular 
nationalism in China and Japan, at the same time, elements of general humanistic concern are 
brewing and these elements may be critical to the process of long-term reconciliation.  One way 
that this phenomenon has manifested itself is in the entertainment industry.  The popular film, 
City of Life and Death caused tremendous controversy in China, over what may appear to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134Rose, 28. 
135“Japanese groups involved in pursuing reconciliation with China originate mainly, but not exclusively, from the 
left, and include anti-war groups, education-related groups, lawyers’ associations, war veterans’ associations, 
organizations run by teachers, academics, journalists, union representatives, and so on.” 
Ibid., 29. 
136Ibid., 28-29. 
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sympathy for Japanese soldiers in the film’s portrayal of the Rape of Nanking.   In contrast, Tim 
Trausch argues that the film intends to break down binary constructions (e.g. good vs. bad, 
perpetrator vs. victim, Chinese vs. Japanese) in order to highlight the fact that war is destructive 
for everybody and that individuals ultimately bear the effects of war.  Specifically, Trausch 
explores the film’s utilization of multiple narrations from various vantage points, whereby both 
“the self and other” are narrated.  Trausch argues that this style allows for “transnational 
narration,” which again, reverberates back to the breaking down of binary constructions (i.e. one 
state’s narrative versus another, or the victimizer state’s narrative versus the victim state’s 
narrative).137 
 The rise of civil lawsuits reflects the rising wave of transnational civil society in China, 
Japan, and South Korea.  “The Chinese redress movement began in September 1988, when more 
than 200 residents of a village in Shandong Province sent the first letter seeking compensation 
for forced labor in Japan to the Japanese government by way of the Japanese Embassy in 
Beijing.”138 The Chinese lawsuits are important in achieving Rigby’s characterization of 
reconciliation, which requires active grassroots participation.  On the one hand, “the hearings and 
trials revive painful and contentious historical memories” and receives extensive media 
coverage.139  Importantly, “[l]eading activists like Wang Xuan joined the movement not out of 
hatred of the Japanese; rather, they wanted to engage in constructive dialogues with Japanese 
through the suits.  Wang emphasized that she was seeking to reject war with peace by talking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137Tim Trausch, “National Consciousness vs. Transnational Narration,” in Chinese Identities on Screen, Klaus 
Muhlhahn, Clemens Von Haselberg, eds.,  2012.   
138Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2006), 304. 
139“The China Central Television named Wang Xuan [a Chinese plantiff] one of the ten people that “emotionally 
moved China the most in 2002, along with the likes of Yao Ming, the number one draft pick of the U.S. National 
Basketball Association in 2002…The China Central Television began airing a documentary series on the Chinese 
lawsuits in Japan in September 2003.”  
Ibid., 319. 
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about the war responsibility issue rather than seeking a vicious cycle of violence.”140  These 
lawsuits are often brought to court in Japan with the cooperation of groups in Japan that provide 
funding for the individuals’ court proceedings, pro-bono litigation services, and evidence from 
research by Japanese scholars.   
 Moreover, in response to the textbook debates of 1982, the mid-1980s, and the late 1990s, 
civil society groups and individuals in China, Japan, and South Korea have launched a joint-
textbook writing effort.  “In May 2005, the first joint history textbook in East Asia, The Modern 
and Contemporary History of Three East Asian Countries, was simultaneously published in 
China, South Korea, and Japan (in the respective languages of each country), after three years of 
preparation.  This nongovernmental project, in which some fifty independent teachers, historians, 
and members of civic groups from the three nations participated, aimed to establish a jointly 
recognized interpretation of history.”141  The textbook attempts to break the binary constructs of 
perpetrator/victim narrative by using an “introspective narrative” that “encourages its readers to 
explore the deep roots and causes of historical tragedies, to reflect on past mistakes, and to learn 
from history.”142  Though not without its own shortcomings, the joint history writing can allow 
people to step out of the patriarchal, hetero-normative, masculine-privileged, nationalisms and 
move into a more general humanist understanding of tragedy and interstate relations to allow for 
meaningful reconciliation.   
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“If Japan and China cooperate, they can support half the Heavens.” 
          --Deng Xiaoping143 
Conclusion: 
 As a hegemon in the global system, the United States played an important role in the 
development of postwar Sino-Japanese relations.  The most obvious influence lies in U.S. 
occupation of Japan and the resulting U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which continues to promise 
U.S. defense of Japan with Japan officially prohibited from maintaining offensive capability.  
The United States continues to maintain military bases in Japan and United States maintains 
Japan to be its strongest ally in East Asia.144  Japan cannot conduct truly independent foreign 
policy; it is forced to be an accomplice in U.S. grand strategy.  Under the Cold War context, 
China and Japan became automatic enemies.  Japan only normalized relations with the People’s 
Republic of China after the U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972 to build 
diplomatic relations.  Another important occupation legacy is the Tokyo Trials and how the 
United States unilaterally absolved Japan of war guilt under Cold War security considerations.  
From the initially idealistic goals of “democracy and demilitarization,” the United States quickly 
reverted to dismissing the charges against and supporting the leadership of the wartime 
conservative elite and rebuilding Japan’s military capacity.  With the communist victory in China, 
the United States very quickly shifted its focus from reforming Japan, the wartime aggressor, to 
rebuilding Japan into a bulwark against communism in the Asia Pacific region.   
 The other central issue in the triangular relationship involves the Taiwan controversy.  
After the brief postwar cooperation between the KMT and the CCP collapsed in 1946, the United 
States continued to support the losing KMT.  After the CCP established the People’s Republic in 
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1950, the United States recognized Chiang Kaishek’s Republic of China on Taiwan as the 
legitimate Chinese state.  The United States did not officially recognize the PRC until 1979.   
The Treaty of Peace with Japan or the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed between Japan and 48 
Allied nations to officially end World War II and to allocate war reparations in 1951 did not 
include either the PRC or the ROC because of international controversy over which government 
was legitimate.  However, Japan was pressured by the United States to sign a separate peace 
treaty with the ROC in 1952.  Only until 1972 did Japan establish a Joint Communiqué with 
China whereby Japan recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and China 
officially renounced claims for war reparations for the Second War World.  Therefore, although 
the war ended in 1945, as a result of the overbearing U.S. influence on bilateral relations, the two 
sides did not come to an official agreement on the terms of the conclusion of the war until 1972.  
Moreover, China continues to view Taiwan to belong to China and asserts that the Taiwan issue 
is a domestic Chinese issue.  U.S. and (U.S.-encouraged) Japanese relations with Taiwan are 
interpreted as meddlesome and represent an affront to Chinese sovereignty (particularly since 
Japan had annexed Taiwan in 1895 and official held Taiwan as a colony until Japan’s surrender 
in 1945).  The CCP includes Taiwan’s foreign domination in its narrative of China’s century of 
humiliation and asserts reunification to be one of its goals in reviving China from national 
humiliation or injured masculinity.   
 The “history problem” continues to impact Sino-Japanese relations as a result of the 
interplay of domestic and external factors that have unearthed underlying concerns with 
masculinity complexes.  In the contemporary period, the Chinese government’s emphasis on 
Japan’s aggressive history and inability to repent for its past wrongs is utilized to revert the 
Chinese populace’s attention back to the tacit agreement that the CCP’s government was 
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founded upon, which was to strengthen China, regain its lost masculinity importantly, by 
safeguarding its national essence from the threat of foreign incursion.  The rhetoric of Japanese 
aggression and remilitarization is also helpful for a rising China to curry alignment with its 
neighbors and regionally contain Japan.  On another level, it is used to undermine trust between 
the United States and Japan as a means to weaken the U.S.-Japan security alliance that has 
allowed the United States to maintain a powerful offensive military position within incredible 
geographic proximity to China.  Because of China’s historical superiority complex resulting 
from perceiving itself to be the apex of civilization and from being the supreme patriarch in its 
Sino-centric system of international relations, its feelings of humiliation and injured masculinity 
from invasion and subjugation by the West and Japan in its early modern and modern period are 
exceptionally strong.145  These feelings have become re-inculcated in the Chinese populace by 
the Chinese government with a particular emphasis on the CCP’s difficult efforts and immense 
triumphs over safeguarding Chinese national polity and reviving China to its historically-proven 
rightful position of (at least regional) dominance.146   
 On the other side, Japan’s powerful postwar economic position has declined, with its 
masculinity threatened and in response there has been a corresponding rise of neo-nationalism 
seeking to halt and rebuild the declining masculinity by re-instilling national pride that is no 
longer exclusively based upon economic performance, but including more “traditional” measures 
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146One way that the CCP has showcased its successful efforts at reviving China is the narrative that was built around 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  “At the official website of the Beijing Organizing Committee for Olympic Games, an 
article appeared entitled ‘From ‘Sick Man of East Asia’ to ‘Sports Big Power’’…Many Chinese [have come to] 
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of masculinity, such as military power.147  Japan’s underperforming economy since the 1990s 
has threatened the sanctity of the salaryman model of ideal citizen and masculinity.  The national 
government has largely been captured by more right-wing conservative influences that seek to 
revert Japan’s de-masculinization from the U.S.-imposed Article 9 and the occupation legacy of 
apologetic national education.  Though there exist strong progressive groups in Japan, liberals 
have largely failed to seize and maintain national leadership.  The renowned nationalist, Shinzo 
Abe’s victory in the 2012 elections demonstrated an overall disillusionment with the 
governments of the left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan and a renewed embrace with the 
right-leaning Liberal Democratic Party.148  Chinese emphasis on the Rape of Nanking further 
fuels conservative influence in Japan.  Conservatives use outside criticisms of Japanese wartime 
aggression to confirm its agenda of redefining and rebuilding Japanese masculinity, as expressed 
by Nobukatsu Fujioka, when he declared his adamancy against Japan being “branded as a sex 
criminal.”  In Japan, citizens are increasingly receptive to the idea of a ‘normal’ Japan that is 
able to conduct its own foreign policy and defend its own national polity.149  
 During times of crisis, whether internal-based, external-based, or both, the government 
experiences a loss of masculinity from its inability to maintain stability and to safeguard the 
national polity and can recapture the loyalty of its people by galvanizing popular nationalism in a 
way that unites people and redefines the threat in the state’s favor.  For states to be successful at 
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this, they have to continue to hold some level of material power (i.e. the economy is not 
completely falling apart and the security of the state is not existentially threatened): survival and 
belonging are both fundamental to human nature.  Therefore, contemporary China has been able 
to transfer the people’s dissatisfaction with the CCP into nationalism that is targeted against 
Japan.  Moreover, this narrative has taken such hold because the government is able focus the 
narrative drawing from events in China’s modern history and from legendary stories of China’s 
millennia-long civilization.  The narrative is also powerfully strengthened by personal stories of 
trauma that allow individuals to confirm the ideas over time.  The Rape of Nanking carries such 
a gendered weight that allows individuals to powerfully personalize China’s national humiliation 
and unite over the cause of redemption.150   
 The conservative government in Japan is also working to redeem its national legitimacy 
in the face of prolonged economic recession.  Therefore, it seeks to redefine the state’s 
masculinity to include military power, which also signifies a return to a more “traditional” 
valuation of masculinity.  The postwar economic miracle focused Japan’s masculinity on 
economic performance and the salaryman became the masculine ideal.  However, “traditional” 
masculine ideals in many societies often include military valor; Japan certainly has a deep 
culture of reverence for military valor with the high position of the samurai class and influence 
of the bushido ethics in Japanese history.  Having military capacity defines a state sovereignty in 
the world system and allows it to fulfill the most fundamental promise to its people under the 
social contract, which is national security.  Being able to feel masculine while accepting the 
relinquishment of normal military power is viewed an “untraditional” embrace of masculinity 
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Because of the privilege of rationality in our society, science is held on a pedestal.  By confounding gender with sex, 
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(which was Japan’s only choice at the time).  With a faltering economy (but, not failing), Japan 
is hoping to boost the image of the military to rebuild faith in the state’s masculinity.  China 
certainly helps with this rhetoric of a need for having a ‘normal’ military, with its increasing 
assertiveness over issues such as disputed islands.  Therefore, Japan will be increasingly 
intolerant of China’s portrayal of its masculinity as being aggressively perverted, as portrayed in 
films on the Rape of Nanking in China.  As Japan further seeks to become ‘normal’ and to 
remove its wartime stigma, the CCP will only continue to use such gendered narratives to not 
only galvanize Chinese nationalism against Japan, but also re-alarm the feelings of the peoples of 
other Asian states that suffered from Japanese aggression.   
  Foreign invasion or imposition appears to be most powerful in capturing the idea of the 
threat of survival via rendering a people impotent.  Thus, even when there no longer exists an 
existential foreign threat, a government can choose to recall back to the danger of foreign threat 
in order to rebuild a shaken legitimacy.  Though arguably a diversionary tactic, nationalistic 
education is a fundamental component of all states.   The importance of public support to the 
sustainability of any state government is non-negligible.151  These narratives are most powerful 
when they involve binary simplifications of historical events.  Heteronormative gender 
constructs inherently underlie binary notions.  These constructions powerfully resound with the 
primal human nature of concern for potency and fertility, as they are foundational to survival.  
Merged with narratives about the history of the people, feelings of nationalism are powerfully 
galvanized, whereby individuals can individually feel the injured masculinity of the state and of 
the collective national essence being violated through an “imagined community,” as described by 
Benedict Anderson.  Today, China and Japan both utilize narratives of foreign incursion, either 
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directly or indirectly in order for the states to boost domestic legitimacy.  The emphasis on 
historical wronging by other states during periods of weakness builds a highly amplified injured 
masculinity complex among the populace.  Though useful in boosting a government’s domestic 
legitimacy, they also come with the price of serving to constrain the actions of the state, as the 
more these feelings are amplified, the more the people holds the state accountable to taking a 
strong stance against any questions over history in dealings with other states. 
 Therefore, civil society actors can be indispensable to meaningful reconciliation between 
China and Japan.  The Chinese and Japanese states’ efforts to inculcate domestic confidence in 
their state’s masculinity perpetuate a cycle in which each state’s assertiveness provokes a rivaled 
response.  Engagement of individuals and non-state groups in China, Japan, and the United 
States can help to foster long-term understanding between China and Japan.  Moreover, the level 
of transnational cooperation involved in civil lawsuit and joint-textbook writing efforts helps 
towards building a generally humanistic view of the tragedies of war which effectively channels 
the rising public sentiments over Japanese apology away from the binary, antagonistic, 
nationalist views that are in-conducive to reconciliation. 
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Appendix A 
 
 I gathered informal information from unnamed Chinese and Japanese college students 
regarding the Nanjing Massacre in order to gain a sense of contemporary sentiment of Sino-
Japanese relations, beyond my secondary research.  This is not meant to be a thorough survey; in 
total I spoke to about eleven individuals either in-person, through email, or other forms of social 
media.  I collected basic identifying information such as gender, age, and city/town of residence 
(and sometimes, the university of attendance).  Probably, my greatest surprise was the wide 
range of opinions and the degree of awareness over the Nanjing Massacre among the Japanese 
nationals.  Of course, I cannot draw any significant conclusions, as this is not a thorough survey 
research; however, in general, it appears that the spectrum of opinions is reflective of the 
divergent neo-nationalists and anti-war pacifists trend from my secondary research.  
 The following is the basic list of questions that I extended to Chinese nationals.  Overall, 
I attempted to encourage open-ended discussion as much as possible.  The responses were either 
in Mandarin Chinese or English (I have Mandarin Chinese language capability). 
1) When was your first exposure (when did you first hear about the Nanjing massacre)? 
2) Talk about your first exposure in school (what you learned, what age you were, etc..) 
3) When you learned about it as you got older, over the years were there any changes in the way 
you learned about the event? 
4) Did your grandparents/parents talk about the massacre with you…if so what are their opinions? 
5) General opinions/feelings about the massacre and/or Japan (including current bilateral 
issues).  
 The following is the basic list of questions that I extended to Japanese nationals.  Overall, 
I attempted to encourage open-ended discussion.  The responses were in English.   
1) First exposure in general. 
2) First exposure in school. (when? what did you learn?  vivid memories or emotions?)   In 
school textbook, were the words used were more like "shinshutsu" or "shinryaku"?152   
3) Over the years, were they any changes in the way that you learned about the massacre?  Were 
there changes in the way that the event was portrayed in the textbook and/or by your 
teachers?  Did your teachers ever express personal opinions on the matter? 
4) Is the Pacific War (WWII in Asia) ever discussed by parents and grandparents Did your 
grandparents and/or parents ever discuss this topic [Nanjing Massacre]?  If so, how did they 
portray it? 
5) General opinions/feelings about the Nanjing Massacre, the Pacific War (WWII in Asia), and 
China (including current bilateral issues).   
6) Do you know the event as “Nankin Jiken” or “Nankin Daigyakusatsu"?153 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152“shinshutsu” means “advance,” while “shinryaku” means “invade.”  The first carries more much neutral tone 
without incriminating the aggression of the Japanese Imperial Army during WWII.  Many critics have pointed to the 
usage of “shinshutsu” instead of “shinryaku” in Japanese textbooks when describing the Nanjing Massacre 
specifically or Japanese aggression in China broadly, as attempts to “whitewash” Japanese history.  
153“Jiken” translates to “incident,” while “daigyakusatsu" translates to “massacre.”  Similar to "shinshutsu" versus 
"shinryaku," one carries a significantly heavier meaning of atrocity and aggression than the other.   
